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“Warning: Predatory Lender”—A 
Proposal for Candid Predatory Small 
Loan Ordinances 
Christopher L. Peterson* 
Abstract 
Over a hundred different local governments around the country 
have adopted ordinances restricting small, high-cost loans. This 
trend reflects the solid majority of the American public that opposes 
the legality of triple-digit interest rate loans and the long historical 
tradition of treating payday and car-title lending as a serious civil 
offense or even a crime. Nevertheless, perhaps owing to limits on 
municipal power, local payday lending law has generated relatively 
little scholarship or commentary. This paper describes the existing 
local law governing small, high-cost consumer loans and proposes a 
more emphatic ordinance that better reflects the policy judgment of 
many local leaders and a solid majority of the America public. In 
particular, this paper (1) introduces the historical background of 
regulation of usurious lending; (2) analyzes the recent growth in local 
ordinances attempting to control small, high-cost loans; (3) discusses 
the evidence of market failure in the small, high-cost loan market; 
(4) proposes a model ordinance requiring that lenders who offer 
loans in excess of 45% per annum display a cautionary message that 
reads: “Warning: Predatory Lender,” on their street, storefront, and 
other on-premises signs; and (5) argues that the well-established 
municipal authority over signage provides a solid statutory and 
constitutional basis for such a law. An appendix with a model 
ordinance suitable for adoption by most local governments follows. 
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I. Introduction 
While the heated academic debate over the wisdom of tolerating 
triple-digit interest rates for consumer finance continues, there is 
one way in which payday and car-title loans remain relatively 
uncontroversial. Today, an overwhelming majority of Americans—
about three out of four—support traditional usury law prohibiting 
predatory triple-digit interest rate loans.1 In every public ballot 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Center for Responsible Lending, Congress Should Cap Interest 
Rates: Survey Confirms Public Support for Cracking Down on High-Cost 
Lending (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-
lending/policy-legislation/congress/interest-rate-survey.pdf (“Three out of four 
Americans who expressed an opinion think that Congress should cap interest 
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referendum ever conducted on the subject, Americans have 
overwhelmingly voted in favor of traditional usury limits on the 
interest rates of consumer loans.2 Perhaps surprising in an era of 
polarized politics, usurious lenders have lost these ballot measures 
in red, blue, and swing states.3 These votes against predatory credit 
                                                                                                     
rates at some level. 72% think that the annual interest rate cap should be no 
higher than 36% annually.”). “Only one quarter of those who expressed an 
opinion think Congress should not cap interest rates at all.” Id. The telephone 
survey reached 1,004 adults in the continental United States. Id. CRL weighted 
the sample by age, sex, geographic region, and race to suggest a 95% chance 
that the survey results are accurate within 2%. Id.; see also Center for Policy 
Entrepreneurship, Poll on Payday Lending Legislation (Feb. 15, 2008), available 
at http://www.c-pe.org/download/PaydayLendingReform/PollPaydayLending.pdf 
(stating that a weighted sample of 500 Colorado voters found “74% of 
respondents are in favor of proposed legislation that will set a cap of 36% on the 
interest and fees that a company can charge for payday loans”); Kentucky 
Coalition for Responsible Lending, Kentucky Voters Support a 36 Percent Rate 
on Payday Loans, Despite Database and Job Loss Threats (2010), available at 
http://kyresponsiblelending.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/kcrl_polling_data_fact_
sheet_2-7-11.pdf (stating that a survey of “[n]early 400 voters from 179 cities 
and towns across the Commonwealth” found “73% of voters across the 
Commonwealth support a 36% APR cap on payday loans”). 
 2. Ballot measures on usury limits have occurred in Arizona, Montana, 
and Ohio. The public voted overwhelmingly in favor of usury limits in all three 
states. See Tom Jacobson, Op-ed., GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Great Falls, MT), Jan. 6, 
2011 (“Ballot Initiative 164, which took effect Jan. 1, capped the annual interest 
rates on payday and car title loans at 36 percent . . . . The measure passed with 
72 percent of the vote statewide. It won in every county and House 
district . . . .”); Marian McClure & Debbie McCune Davis, Op-ed., Let’s Make 
Sure the Sun Sets on Arizona Payday Loans, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 2009, 
at B5 (“60 percent of Arizona voters soundly rejected 400 percent annual 
interest rates on payday loans, when 1.2 million Arizonans rejected the payday 
lenders’ Proposition 200. The lenders spent more than $14 million trying to fool 
the people. The voters saw through their scam.”); Editorial, Ohio Voters Prove 
that a Good Idea Can Beat $22 Million, AKRON BEACON J. (Ohio), Nov. 6, 2008  
Voters handed the industry a deservedly humiliating defeat, rejecting 
one of the slickest and most misleading campaigns in the state this 
election season by a ratio of roughly 2-to-1. The defeat of the lenders 
is particularly gratifying, as their efforts carefully concealed the 
industry’s goal to regain the license to charge excessive interest rates 
to borrowers desperate for quick loans. 
 3. See Jacobson, supra note 2; McClure & McClure supra note 2; Ohio 
Voters Prove that a Good Idea Can Beat $22 Million, supra note 2; see also 
Center for Policy Entrepreneurship, supra note 1 (stating that a Colorado 
telephone survey finding “overwhelming support, regardless of political 
affiliation, region, gender, income, education level, ethnicity and age. 83% of 
Democrats, 72% of Unaffiliated and 68% of Republicans favored new caps on 
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pricing are even more emphatic when considered in light of massive 
industry advertising campaigns that nonetheless utterly failed to 
persuade voters.4  
This broad-based support for usury limits is built upon 
American history, tradition, and culture. For nearly three-hundred 
years, American states were nearly unanimous in their prohibition 
of usurious lending through double- or even single-digit interest rate 
caps.5 Every signatory to the Declaration of Independence returned 
to colonies that aggressively capped interest rates.6 When the 
“greatest generation” assumed the mantle of public leadership after 
emerging from the Great Depression and the second World War, all 
fifty states capped interest rates on small consumer loans with a 
median limit of 36% per annum.7 For generations, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation used undercover investigations to track 
down usurious lenders and incarcerate them.8 The American 
public’s skepticism has at least in part grown out of a moral view, 
grounded in the prevailing Christian faith of most Americans, that 
the taking of excessive interest is a grave and punishable sin.9 
                                                                                                     
payday loans”). 
 4. See, e.g., Steve Hoffman, Battle of the Ballot Issues, AKRON BEACON J., 
(Ohio) Apr. 28, 2011, at A6 (stating that voters upheld the Ohio interest rate cap 
“seeing through an incredible barrage of misleading television ads”). 
 5. RANSOM H. TYLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY, PAWNS OR 
PLEDGES, AND MARITIME LOANS 50 (1891) (discussing states in early United 
States history with double- and single-digit interest rate caps). 
 6. Id. 
 7. TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998); Christopher L. 
Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience 
Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1138 
(2008). 
 8. See DENNIS FITZGERALD, INFORMANTS AND UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 228–29 (2007). 
 9. About a dozen Biblical passages suggest that usurious lending, 
especially to the poor, is a grave sin. For example, the first reference to usury in 
the Bible states: “If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, 
thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.” 
Exodus 22:25 (King James). The Bible also intimates a harsh punishment for 
usurers: “Hath given forth upon usury, and hath taken increase: shall he then 
live? he shall not live: he hath done all these abominations; he shall surely die; 
his blood shall be upon him.” Ezekiel 18:13 (King James); see also Ezekiel 22:16–
22 (King James); Jeremiah 15:10 (King James); John 2:14–15 (King James); 
Leviticus 25:35–37 (King James); Luke 6:33–35 (King James); Matthew 5:42 
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While not all subscribe to this moral value, it is clear that America 
reached the zenith of its power, wealth, and international prestige 
following centuries of aggressive enforcement of usury law and a 
robust thrift ethic. 
Nevertheless, in recent decades federal and state usury law has 
become more lax and less transparent. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha Service Corp.10 
adopted a historically controversial interpretation of a Civil War-era 
banking law that allowed national banks to export high interest rate 
loans from deregulated states to consumers living in traditionally 
regulated states.11 This ignited a race to the bottom in which state 
legislatures were pressured to raise or eliminate usury limits in 
order to avoid “discriminating” against local banks.12 Moreover, high 
                                                                                                     
(King James); Nehemiah 5:1–13 (King James); Proverbs 28:6–9 (King James); 
Psalm 15:1, 4–5 (King James); Luke 6:31–36 (King James); John 2:14–15 (King 
James). The Biblical condemnation of usurious lenders is closely related to the 
deep and consistent message of the Bible demanding kind and just treatment of 
poor and vulnerable members of society. Deuteronomy demands “[t]hou shalt 
not oppress an hired servant that is poor and needy, whether he be of thy 
brethren, or of thy strangers that are in thy land within thy gates.” 
Deuteronomy 24:14 (King James). The Bible commands Christians to “[e]xecute 
true judgment, and shew mercy and compassion every man to his brother; [a]nd 
oppress not the widow, nor the fatherless, the stranger, nor the poor . . . .” 
Zechariah 7:9–10 (King James); see also BENJAMIN N. NELSON, THE IDEA OF 
USURY: FROM TRIBAL BROTHERHOOD TO UNIVERSAL OTHERHOOD  (1949) (providing 
a summary and analysis of post-reformation Christian theology of usury); 
Charles H. George, English Calvinist Opinion on Usury, 1600–1640, 18 J. HIST. 
IDEAS 455, 455–74 (1957) (same); Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, 
Usury Law and the Christian Right: Faith-Based Political Power and the 
Geography of American Payday Loan Regulation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 637, 648–
55 (2008) (same). See generally ODD LANGHOLM, THE ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS OF 
USURY (1985) (providing pre-reformation analysis of Christian usury theology); 
JOHN T. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957) (same); Brian M. 
McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and the Lost Theory of 
Usury, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 549 (2008) (same). 
 10. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 
(1978) (considering “whether Omaha Bank and its Bank Americard program are 
‘located’ in Nebraska and for that reason entitled to charge its Minnesota 
customers the rate of interest authorized by Nebraska law”). 
 11. Id. (stating that “a national bank may charge interest ‘on any loan’ at 
the rate allowed by the laws of the State in which the bank is ‘located’” (citation 
omitted)); see also James J. White, The Usury Trompe l’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 
451–53 (2000) (discussing the Marquette decision). 
 12. See Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? 
Limitations on the Use of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 
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inflation in the late 1970s raised lenders’ cost of funds, making 
profitable consumer lending temporarily more difficult within 
traditional interest rate caps.13 This unusual macroeconomic 
pressure led some states to relax or eliminate their usury limits.14 
More recently, nationally organized, well-funded, and narrowly 
focused state-by-state lobbying campaigns have persuaded many 
state legislators serving on key financial services committees to 
adopt special licensing statutes authorizing non-depositary finance 
companies to make triple-digit interest rate payday and car-title 
loans. As a result, usury limits no longer prohibit these loans for 
banks in all fifty states and for non-depositary lenders in about 
thirty-five states. 
Still, while federal and state law has unraveled, many local 
leaders around the country continue to ardently support the 
traditionally restrictive American moral and legal view about 
usurious lending to families. Responding to the vacuum in usury 
law, over a hundred different local governments around the country 
have adopted ordinances attempting to restrict payday and car-title 
lending.15 Although this growing trend has generated relatively 
little national press or scholarly commentary,16 it appears to reflect 
                                                                                                     
1128–30 (2010) (stating that in the wake of Marquette, legislatures in a number 
of states “either eliminated or drastically relaxed their usury laws and enacted 
other provisions that favor credit-card users”). 
 13. See PAUL R. BEARES, CONSUMER LENDING 12 (2d ed. 1992) (“[T]he 
Vietnam War was fueling inflationary pressures which made funds more 
expensive and harder for banks to attract. Disintermediation—the flow of funds 
out of depository institutions to sources paying higher rates—drained funds 
available for lending and drove up the cost of funds.”). 
 14. See id. (“[P]rofit margins were severely squeezed as a result of a 1979 
change in Federal Reserve policy that allowed interest rates to float freely at the 
same time as the rates banks were allowed to pay for deposits were being 
deregulated.”). 
 15. Unpublished database on file with author. 
 16. There are two notable exceptions. See generally Kelly Griffith, Linda 
Hilton & Lynn Drysdale, Controlling the Growth of Payday Lending Through 
Local Ordinances and Resolutions (Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (“This 
guide has been developed to assist community consumer advocates and 
government officials take action to combat payday lenders in local communities 
and at state legislatures.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Amy Lavine, Zoning Out Payday Loan Stores and Other Alternative Financial 
Services Providers (July 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885197 (“This article will 
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the great majority of the American public that supports the 
illegality of triple-digit interest rate loans and the long historical 
tradition of treating payday and car-title lending as a serious civil 
offense, and in many states, a crime.  
This Article explores the growing trend of municipal ordinances 
and resolutions attempting to inhibit payday and car-title lending. 
In particular, Part I introduces the historical background of 
usurious lending regulation that provides the context within which 
current local law must be understood. Part II describes and 
analyzes the growing number of local ordinances controlling small, 
high-cost loans and suggests that, owing to the limits on local power, 
current local law has had very limited success in meeting its own 
objectives. Instead, Part III proposes a model ordinance requiring 
that lenders offering loans with annual percentage rates in excess of 
45% display a cautionary message that reads “Warning: Predatory 
Lender” on their street, storefront, and other on-premises signs. 
Part IV argues that the well-established municipal authority over 
signage provides a solid constitutional and statutory basis for such a 
law. Part V concludes and is followed by an appendix with a model 
ordinance suitable for adoption by most local governments. 
II. The Law of Predatory Small Loans in Historical Context 
All of the thirteen original American colonies aggressively 
regulated consumer loans with annual interest rate caps of between 
eight and five percent, with six percent being most typical.17 
European colonists had imported these price limits from England, 
which at the time capped interest rates with a simple nominal 
annual rate of five percent.18 Both American and English usury law 
grew out of both Protestant and Catholic theology on the moral 
                                                                                                     
provide an overview of the various approaches that local governments have 
taken to regulate alternative financial services providers.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See TYLER, supra note 5, at 50–53 (discussing the history of usury laws 
in early American history); Peterson, supra note 7, at 1117–18 (explaining that 
the thirteen original colonies “unanimously adopted usury laws capping interest 
rates” and the most common rate was six percent). 
 18. See Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest, 1713, 12 Ann., c. 16 (Eng.) 
(stating that the interest rate shall not exceed five percent per year). 
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limits of acceptable lending practices.19 Early American leaders held 
usurious lenders in contempt. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, most states in the 
Union began modifying their interest rate caps to allow more 
expensive consumer loans. The change reflected the evolving 
consumer culture of an industrializing America.20 As more 
Americans earned their income through relatively stable salaries, 
rather than seasonal agricultural income, managing a household’s 
needs through the use of moderately priced consumer finance 
became more culturally acceptable.21 Throughout most of the 
twentieth century, “Small Loan Acts” were the primary consumer 
financial protection law in the country. Most states based their laws 
on a model statute sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation, a 
charitable foundation created by the widow of a railroad baron.22 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 9, at 648−55 (discussing usury laws 
and the Christian faith). Protestant reformers, such as Martin Luther, believed 
that interest rates of 5–6% were moral, and that even 8% was permissible in 
some cases. NORMAN JONES, GOD AND THE MONEYLENDERS 47–48, 77 (1989). 
Moreover, after centuries of prohibiting any interest whatsoever, Pope Paul II 
gave his tacit approval to charitable pawnshops to charge a 6% simple nominal 
annual rate in 1461. Id. at 76. 
 20. See LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL 
HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 134–35, 143 (1999) (discussing the legalization of 
small loan lending through the Uniform Small Loan Act and the propaganda 
about “the productive nature of small loans”). 
 21. See id. at 143 (discussing the “success story” which was a tactic used by 
lenders to promote “the productive nature of small loans”). 
 22. See ROGER S. BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAWS AND 
OF USURY, SALES FINANCE, AND ALLIED LAWS xiii (1952) (“Since 1916, the guide 
for most consumer finance legislation has been the Draft of the Uniform Small 
Loan Law recommended by the Russell Sage Foundation when the enactment 
occurred.”). Many of the states that did not use the Russell Sage Foundation 
model law relied on statutes that legalized “Morris Plan” lending, which 
facilitated higher real prices by using an add-on interest rate, rather than 
traditional simple actuarial interest rates. See EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE 
CONSUMER 68–72 (1930) (discussing the use and development of The Morris 
Plan); FRED H. CLARKSON ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT AND ITS USES 32 (Charles O. 
Hardy ed., 1938) (“The [Morris] plan was that notes be discounted at the 
maximum contract rate of interest permitted, and then repaid through the 
purchase of investment certificates on a periodic installment basis.”); KATHLEEN 
E. KEEST, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND 
LEGAL CHALLENGES § 2.2.3.1, at 39 (1995) (discussing the plan developed by 
Arthur Morris “which treated loans as repayable in a single lump sum at the 
end of the agreed term and computed interest accordingly”). See generally PETER 
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State Small Loan Acts licensed finance companies, authorizing 
them to charge interest rates ranging from 24%–42% per year, with 
36% being typical.23 Social reformers who lobbied for these rules 
argued that ordinary citizens ought to have access to credit, and 
that higher interest rate limits in this range were still within a price 
zone where borrowers could benefit from the credit and have a 
reasonable opportunity to repay.24 These low double-digit interest 
rate usury limits allowed the development of credit cards and retail 
installment loan purchasing that became a staple of middle-class 
America. 
By the 1960s, every state in the union had some form of a small 
loan law on the books.25 A handful of states had exceptions or 
ambiguity in their usury limits that allowed higher interest rates by 
historical standards. But nonetheless, a typical contemporary 
payday and car-title loan continued to be illegal in every state of the 
Republic. Although today payday and car-title lenders chafe at the 
term “predatory lender,” with relatively few exceptions, these loans 
were illegal and often regarded as serious crimes for over three-
hundred years of American history.26 From America’s emergence as 
                                                                                                     
W. HERZOG, THE MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL BANKING (1928) (discussing the 
evolution of The Morris Plan). 
 23. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1120 (stating that states granted 
“licensed lenders special exemptions to the older usury laws (which generally 
remained on the books) authorizing interest rates between 2% and 4% per 
month, or, between 24% and 42% per annum”). 
 24. See IRVING S. MICHELMAN, CONSUMER FINANCE: A CASE HISTORY IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 112–29 (1970) (discussing “the remedial loan association 
movement” and the fight against loan sharks). 
 25. Peterson, supra note 7, at 1138 (“In 1965, every state in the union had 
a usury limit on consumer loans.”). 
 26. See SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 
428–29 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the history of illegal loan interest rates); 
Peterson, supra note 7, at 1119 (“This deep American skepticism of consumer 
lending encouraged a legal commitment to limited interest rates that continued 
largely unabated through the end of the nineteenth century.”).  See also Beasley 
v. Coleman, 180 So. 625, 629 (Fla. 1938) (quashing a habeas corpus petition that 
challenged conviction for making an approximately 520% interest rate salary 
loan in violation of Florida’s statute imposing up to six months incarceration for 
usury); Jarvis v. State, 25 S.E.2d 100, 100−01 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) (upholding 
criminal conviction for making an approximately 312% annual interest rate 
salary loan in violation of Georgia’s small loan usury limit); Commonwealth v. 
Morris, 56 N.E. 896, 897 (Mass. 1900) (holding that Massachusetts’s criminal 
penalties of sixty days incarceration for violation of 12% simple nominal annual 
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an industrial power at the turn of the twentieth century through the 
apogee of our hegemonic leadership, the premier bastions of 
consumer protection law were state Small Loan Acts championed by 
the Russell Sage Foundation. 
The United States Supreme Court was the first government 
institution to meaningfully disrupt the centuries-old tradition of 
American usury law. In the 1978 case of Marquette,27 the Court 
confronted for the first time the question of what state usury law 
applies when a national bank lends money to a consumer across 
state lines: Should the law of the bank’s home state or the law of the 
consumer’s home state apply?28 Turning to the National Bank Act, a 
statute adopted in 1864,29 the Supreme Court concluded that 
Congress had intended the law of the bank’s home state to apply.30 
While seemingly innocuous, this holding gave a handful of rural 
states the opportunity to deregulate every other state’s usury limits 
                                                                                                     
usury limit was constitutional); Ex parte Berger, 90 S.W. 759, 760, 763 (Mo. 
1905) (holding that Missouri criminal penalties of 30 to 90 days incarceration 
for violation of 12% annual interest rate limit was constitutional); People v. 
Lombardo, 460 N.E.2d 1074, 1074−75 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that New York’s 
statute defining lending in excess of 25% annual interest as a class C felony was 
not unconstitutionally vague). Some states temporarily experimented with 
eliminating their usury laws for short periods in the nineteenth century. George 
K. Holmes, Usury in Law, in Practice and in Psychology, 7 POL. SCI. Q. 431, 432 
(1892) (“In eighteen states and territories that now have usury laws there have 
been intervals since the first enactment on the subject during which such laws 
were not in force.”). Moreover, in the “wild west” it would often take a few years 
before newly formed states and territories would adopt usury limits. Id. at 436–
42 (discussing the history of usury laws “from the earliest times in January 1, 
1892”).  
 27. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 
439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
 28. See id. at 309–13 (considering which state usury law to apply when a 
national bank lends money to consumers outside of the state in which it is 
“located”). 
 29. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006) (explaining that national banks can charge 
interest rates according to the laws of the state in which they are located). 
 30. See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 309–13 (“Since Omaha Bank and its Bank 
Americard program are ‘located’ in Nebraska, the plain language of § 85 
provides that the bank may charge ‘on any loan’ the rate ‘allowed’ by the State 
of Nebraska.”); see also BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM 
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 725–34 (1957) (detailing the events that led 
to the enactment of the National Bank Act); KEEST, supra note 22, § 3.4.5.1.1 
(questioning the historical accuracy of Marquette).  
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with respect to federally chartered banks.31 Recognizing the 
opportunity to attract banking jobs to their states, South Dakota 
and Delaware quickly repealed their interest rate caps and 
encouraged national banks to open subsidiaries headquartered 
there to “export” the nonexistence of an interest rate cap to 
consumers in other states.32 
For their part, banks chartered by state governments were 
envious of their national bank competitors’ newfound power and 
immediately began lobbying Congress for equal treatment.33 While 
Congress did not explicitly authorize the “exporting” model of 
deregulation, it did finesse the issue by granting state banks 
                                                                                                     
 31. See DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW 10-47 to 10-53 (2002) 
(discussing the Marquette decision’s effect on usury law); William F. Baxter, 
Section 85 of the National Bank Act and Consumer Welfare, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 
1009, 1010–11 (1995) (explaining that after Marquette “no state could regulate 
the rates or services produced by out-of-state national banks, even if the services 
were purchased by its own citizens”); Robert C. Eager & C.F. Muckenfuss, III, 
Federal Preemption and the Challenge to Maintain Balance in the Dual Banking 
System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 66–67 (2004) (“These so-called ‘wild card’ 
statutes vary in their specifics, but generally provide for state banks to be able 
to match national bank, and in some cases federal thrift, activities.”); 
Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the 
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2005) (explaining that the 
Marquette decision “was a starting gun in a corporate race to the bottom that 
significantly eroded the power of state governments to set meaningful interest 
rate caps”); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding 
Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. 
L. REV. 518, 619–20 (2004) (stating that after Marquette banks can “use the 
Exportation Doctrine to disregard any interest rate location in any of those 
other states”). 
 32. See White, supra note 11, at 447–48 (stating “that this statute would 
allow a bank in New York to lend from its South Dakota subsidiary to a resident 
in New York under South Dakota law”). “If the bank comes from a state like 
Delaware  whose laws permit consumer loans without rate or other restrictions, 
the out-of-state bank can ignore not only the local rates, but also the local 
market segmentation.” Id. at 464–65; see also Schiltz, supra note 31, at 618–20 
(stating that “states such as South Dakota and Delaware [have the] incentive to 
engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ of consumer credit regulatory schemes, in order 
to attract consumer lending operations to their states”). 
 33. See Howard J. Finkelstein, Most Favored Lender Status for Insured 
Banks, 42 BUS. L. 915, 918 (1987) (“The rationale for the requirement that 
banks borrowing a rate must also comply with non-rate provisions is simply that 
Congress is presumed to have intended that a bank borrowing a rate from state 
law be put on an equal footing with its state-charted competitor.”). 
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whatever power was already held by national banks.34 As a result, 
state legislatures became powerless to constrain the interest rates 
charged by any bank, whether federal or state chartered, that 
happened to claim its headquarters in South Dakota or Delaware.35 
Seeing no point in punishing their local financial institutions, 
virtually every other state in the union decided to pass “parity laws” 
that gave their own local depository institutions the right to charge 
whatever interest rate South Dakota and Delaware banks could 
import into their jurisdictions via federal law.36 The end result was 
what James White called a trompe l’oeil—a grand illusion.37 Every 
state in the union, save two, had relatively aggressive usury law on 
the books, but these laws no longer applied to any bank in the 
country. 
That being said, at the beginning of the 1980s, state usury 
limits still applied to non-bank lenders. Finance companies, car 
dealerships, retailers, and even mafia loan sharks were still legally 
required to comply with the traditional usury limits.38 Non-
depositary finance companies resented the special treatment of 
banks and in many states began agitating for their own special 
exceptions to the old small loan laws.39 High inflation and prevailing 
                                                                                                     
 34. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(g), 1831a(b), 1831d(a) (2006); see also Interest 
Charges Under Section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 
19258−59 (FDIC Apr. 17, 1998) (opinion) (interpreting Section 27 of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act as providing the same interest-rate exporting powers to 
state-chartered, federally insured banks as Section 85 of the National Bank Act 
grants to national banks). 
 35. KEEST, supra note 22, at 74–75 (discussing the effect of “sister-state” 
preemption). 
 36. See Christian Johnson, Wild Card Statutes, Parity, and National 
Banks—The Renascence of State Banking Powers, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 368 
(1995) (stating that “wild card statutes” can “enable State Banks to enter into 
derivatives, insurance, and other banking powers currently enjoyed primarily by 
National Banks’’); John J. Schroeder, “Duel” Banking System? State Bank Parity 
Laws: An Examination of Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and 
Philosophical Questions, 36 IND. L. REV. 197, 207 (2003) (discussing “parity 
laws”). 
 37. See White, supra note 11, at 447–48 (“I argue that the stern statutory 
restrictions on rates in Minnesota are an illusion whose only current function is 
to give the appearance that the state is protecting consumers from high rates.”). 
 38. Peterson, supra note 7, at 1138–39 (discussing past usury laws and the 
trend towards relaxing usury laws). 
 39. See id. at 1123 (stating that in the 1980s critics “continue[ed] battering 
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interest rates in the late 1970s raised lenders’ cost of funds, and 
made these lobbying efforts, at least temporarily, more persuasive.40 
With prevailing prime interest rates in the double-digit range, 
making profitable consumer loans was difficult under some of the 
lower traditional interest rate caps. This unusual macroeconomic 
pressure along with well-funded state-by-state lobbying campaigns 
persuaded many state legislatures to adopt more expansive usury 
limit exceptions.41 
While payday lending had historical forebears both in the 
United States and around the world, the industry reinvented itself 
in this period by deferring the deposit of borrowers’ personal 
checks.42 In a typical transaction, the borrower would write a 
personal check to the payday lender but date the check for about 
two weeks in the future.43 The lender would, in turn, “cash” the 
check by giving the borrower the face amount of the check less a 
finance charge. After two weeks went by, the borrower could buy 
back the check by bringing cash into the payday lender’s store, or 
simply allow the lender to deposit the check. In many states, payday 
lenders insisted they did not make loans, but rather were simply 
cashing checks.44 In other states, payday lenders teamed up with a 
handful of banks to “rent” the banks’ Marquette powers.45 The 
                                                                                                     
state usury laws” which remained applicable to “nondepository financial 
institutions”). 
 40. See BEARES, supra note 13, at 12 (discussing inflation and the consumer 
movement that was “highly successful in bringing about legislative changes”). 
 41. See id. at 12−13 (explaining that “[t]he consumer credit market faced a 
major trauma in 1980,” and “[f]inancial institutions reacted by increasing 
pressure on state legislators to provide relief from unrealistic usury rate caps”). 
 42. ROBERT MAYER, QUICK CASH 130–34 (2010) (discussing the practice of 
post-dating checks, a “modern version of the payday loan,” which became 
prevalent in the 1980s). 
 43. JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, 
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 30 (1994) (explaining that “check cashing outlets” 
often made payday loans by “cash[ing] a customer’s personal check with the 
understanding that it will not be cleared through the banking system until the 
customer can deposit his next paycheck, perhaps a week or two hence”). 
 44. See, e.g., Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Ky. 1997) 
(rejecting a payday lender’s argument that “it was not charging interest but only 
service fees for cashing checks”). 
 45. See Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater 
Bank Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 146 (2005) (“Non-bank lenders 
such as payday lenders can take advantage of federal preemption by partnering 
 
906 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012) 
payday lender would do the marketing, intake, and collections, but 
would pay a fee to a bank for permission to nominally make the loan 
in the name of the bank.46 Eventually, the federal banking 
regulators cracked down on these practices by issuing guidance 
stating that deferred check cashing is a form of lending governed by 
the Truth in Lending Act47 and that “charter renting” to avoid usury 
limits is an unsafe and unsound banking practice.48 But in the 
meantime, the payday lending industry had developed a critical 
mass, with aggressive trade associations and highly effective 
lobbyists. In many states, payday lenders supported weak 
legislation that purported to “regulate” payday lending but actually 
had little substantive content and primarily served to legitimize 
hitherto illegal or even criminal loans. Indeed with average interest 
rates of around 400%, payday loans were actually much more 
expensive than the old mafia loan sharks that typically charged a 
relatively mild 250%.49 
                                                                                                     
with an out-of-state bank that makes the payday loan and then immediately 
sells it to the payday lender that is located in the state with the restrictive 
usury laws.”); Elizabeth Willoughby, Recent Development, Bankwest v. Baker: 
Is it a Mayday for Payday Lenders in Rent-a-Charter Arrangements?, 9 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 269, 273 (2005) (“Many out-of-state payday lenders currently use 
in-state agents to carry out their business.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Georgia, 400 F.3d 868, 
871 (11th Cir. 2007)  (explaining an agreement in which First American, a bank 
located in Georgia, “managed and serviced” payday loans which were approved 
and funded by First National Bank); People v. Cnty. Bank, 846 N.Y. S.2d 436, 
437–38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (explaining agreements wherein County Bank, 
located in Delaware, agreed to make payday loans which were “market[ed] and 
service[d]” by Telecash, Inc. and CRA Services Corporation). 
 47. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2011). 
 48. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Consent Order No. 
2001-104 (Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-
actions/ea2001-104.pdf; OCC Consent Order No. 2002-93 (October 28, 2002), 
available at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2002-93.pdf; Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., Financial Institution Letter, Guidelines for Payday Lending 
(Feb. 25, 2005) http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405.html (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ben 
Jackson, FDIC Actions Indicate Less Tolerant Stance on Payday, AM. BANKER, 
Mar. 6, 2006, at 1. 
 49. Compare KEITH ERNST, JOHN FARRIS, AND URIAH KING, QUANTIFYING THE 
ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING: A REPORT FROM THE CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3 n.4 (2004), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/ 
system/files/imported/managed_documents/crlpaydaylendingstudy.pdf (last visited 
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With the traditional moral and legal limits crumbling in many 
states, the payday lending industry exploded. In comparison to the 
hundreds of years of stable, thrift-oriented American consumer 
finance, a massive usury industry sprang up almost overnight. In 
the early 1990s, payday lending was a tiny peripheral component of 
the financial services industry with only a few hundred locations 
nationwide.50 But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number of 
locations around the country rapidly grew. For example, after 
Mississippi legitimized payday lending by “regulating” it in 1998, 
the number of payday lenders in the state quickly tripled.51 North 
Carolina payday lending outlets roughly quadrupled in four years, 
growing from 307 in 1997 to 1,204 in 2000.52 Wyoming payday 
lenders almost tripled between 1996 and 1997.53 Payday lending 
outlets quintupled in Salt Lake City between 1994 and 2000.54 In 
                                                                                                     
Apr. 3, 2012) (“[P]lacing the general cost of payday loans between a $15 and $17 
fee per $100 loaned for a period of approximately 14 days, amounts equivalent 
to annual percentage rates of 391% and 443% respectively.” (citation omitted)), 
with Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New York’s Usury Statute, 66 COLUM. 
L. REV. 167, 167 (1966) (“Exorbitant interest rates, averaging 250 per cent 
yearly and sometimes reaching as high as 2,000 per cent, are enforced primarily 
by instilling fear of physical reprisal and, on occasion, by commission of acts of 
violence.”). 
 50. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., An Update on Emerging Issues in Banking: 
Payday Lending (Jan. 29, 2003) http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/ 
012903fyi.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (“Industry analysts estimate that the 
number of payday loan offices nationwide increased from less than 500 in the 
early 1990’s to approximately 12,000 in 2002, with continued growth expected.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 51. See Jimmie E. Gates, Check-Cashing Businesses Rolling out the Dough, 
CLARION LEDGER (Jackson) Feb. 6, 2005, at B1 (“The state has more than 1,000 
check-cashing business[es] today, nearly triple the number in 1998, when the 
Department of Banking and Consumer Finance began regulating the 
companies.”). 
 52. OFFICE OF THE COMM’R OF BANKS, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 
PAYDAY LENDING 5 (2001). 
 53. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, THE GROWTH OF LEGAL LOAN 
SHARKING: A REPORT ON THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY 3 (1998), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/The_Growth_of_Legal_Loan_Sharking_1998.pdf. 
 54. See Christopher L. Peterson, Failed Markets, Failing Government, or Both? 
Learning from the Unintended Consequences of Utah Consumer Credit Law on 
Vulnerable Debtors, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 543, 560–61 (“With only fourteen lenders 
listed in 1994, the industry appears to have since quintupled its outlets in the Salt 
Lake area.”). 
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Iowa, payday lender locations grew eightfold in only two years.55 
Nationwide, the number of payday lender locations more than 
doubled from 10,000 to 22,000 between 2000 and 2004 alone.56 
Today, payday lenders and their secured creditor cousins, the car-
title lenders, are no longer fringe businesses. Rather they are a 
powerful, multi-billion dollar industry that has completely 
transformed lower- and middle-income American consumer finance. 
Despite the usury industry’s formidable commitments to 
campaign finance contributions and government relations, the 
momentum in continuing legislative battles appears to have died 
out. In recent years, several states have re-imposed more traditional 
usury limits. North Carolina led this trend by allowing its payday 
lending authorization statute to expire under a sunset provision in 
2005.57 Georgia,58 New Hampshire,59 Oregon,60 and the District of 
Columbia61 have taken similar measures. In Arkansas, the state 
                                                                                                     
 55. JEAN ANN FOX, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE GROWTH OF LEGAL LOAN 
SHARKING: A REPORT ON THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY (1998), available at 
http://www.in.gov/dfi/2366.htm (“In two years, Iowa payday lenders increased from 
eight to sixty-four. Louisiana licenses 345 lenders.”). 
 56. See Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs 
Justify the Price? 2 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/ wp2005/CFRWP_2005-
09_Flannery_Samolyk.pdf (“The industry is growing very rapidly. Stephens Inc. 
(2004) estimates that the number of stores rose from 10,000 in 2000 to 22,000 in 
2004.”). 
 57. Press Release, N.C. Dep’t of Justice, Payday Lending on the Way Out in 
NC (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ncdoj.gov/News-and-Alerts/News-
Releases-and-Advisories/Press-Releases/Payday-lending-on-the-way-out-in-NC.aspx 
(“The Attorney General’s Office and the State Commissioner of Banks have worked 
together on the issue of lending since state legislators allowed North Carolina’s 
payday lending law to expire after four years on August 31, 2001.”). 
 58. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-3-14 (2011) (“A licensee may charge, contract for, 
receive, and collect interest at a rate not to exceed 10 percent per annum of the face 
amount of the contract, whether repayable in one single payment or repayable in 
monthly or other periodic installments.”). 
 59. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 399-A:13 (2011) (“The annual percentage rate on 
a payday loan shall be no more than 36 percent per year.”). 
 60. OR. REV. STAT. § 725.622 (repealed 2010) (stating that payday lenders 
may not “[m]ake or renew a payday loan at a rate of interest that exceeds 36 
percent per annum, excluding a one-time origination fee for a new loan”). 
 61. D.C. CODE § 28-3301–03 (2011) (“[T]he parties to an instrument in 
writing for the payment of money at a future time may contract therein for the 
payment of interest on the principal amount thereof at a rate not exceeding 24% 
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supreme court used the state’s constitutional interest rate cap to 
overturn legislation authorizing payday lending.62 In Ohio, Arizona, 
and Montana the public has voted to reestablish traditional price 
limits on state ballot measures.63 At the federal level, Congress 
created the first national usury limit capping interest rates 
chargeable to military service members at 36% per year.64 And, of 
course, several states, particularly in the northeast, have 
maintained a steady commitment to traditional usury limits.65 Still, 
in many more states, usurious lenders have managed to forestall a 
return to traditional American law with a variety of cosmetic rules 
that do not provide meaningful consumer protection. It is these 
states that have set the stage for a growing trend of municipal and 
county leadership. 
                                                                                                     
per annum.”). 
 62. McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 289 S.W.3d 18, 27 
(Ark. 2008) (“Because the Act so clearly authorizes usurious interest rates, it 
cannot stand.”); see also Adam L. Bodeker, McGhee v. Arkansas State Board of 
Collection Agencies: Arkansas Shows Predatory Lenders the Door, 63 ARK. L. 
REV. 645, 659 (2010) (“Because the Arkansas Check-cashers Act clearly 
authorized loans charging usurious interest rates in violation of the usury 
provisions of the Arkansas Constitution, the court held the Act unconstitutional 
in its entirety.”). 
 63. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing ballot measures on 
usury limits that have occurred in Ohio, Arizona, and Montana). Despite these 
referendums, the payday lending industry is actively attempting to circumvent 
public will in Ohio and Arizona by exploiting loopholes not closed in the precise 
wording of the ballot measures. See Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in 
the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23, 74–75 (2010) (“Many commentators 
have noted how adept fringe creditors are at avoiding restrictive regulations. 
The recent change in the payday lending law in Arizona provides an example.”). 
 64. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 987(b) (2006)) (“A creditor . . . may not impose an annual percentage rate of 
interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit extended to 
a covered member or a dependent of a covered member.”). 
 65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-563 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-
306(a)(2)(i) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 100 (2002); 209 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 26.01 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-19 (West 2012); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2012); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6213 (West 
2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a(d) (2011). 
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III. Predatory Is as Predatory Does: Inefficiency in Consumer 
Finance Markets 
The government relations and marketing wings of financial 
services companies have long talked at cross purposes. When 
consumer financial services companies speak to legislatures, 
regulators, and courts, they tend to extol faith in the ability of 
financial markets to resolve to efficient outcomes. The hallmark of 
this consumer finance advocacy has always been Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand” guiding allocation of resources to a collectively 
optimal outcome through individuals’ rational, self-interested 
decisions. When the sales and marketing wings of financial services 
firms communicate with prospective borrowers, however, the 
unmotivated invisible hand is replaced by a calculated effort to 
persuade and sometimes to confuse or mislead. Consumer finance 
marketing focuses less on the relationship of supply to demand and 
more on the formation and manipulation of instincts, wants, and 
urges as reasons to borrow.66 While all financial industry lobbyists 
are economists at heart, the best advertisers are psychologists.  
Consistent with this observation, a growing body of 
psychological evidence suggests that borrowers have behavioral 
impulses that lead them into making decisions that are counter to 
their own best interests.67 The characterization of financial-services 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Hooman Estelami, Cognitive Drivers of Suboptimal Financial 
Decisions: Implications for Financial Literacy Campaigns, 13 J. FIN. SERVICES 
MARKETING 273, 275 (2009) (“The explosive use of short-term lending such as 
revolving credit products . . . which tap into consumers’ desire to gain immediate 
access to funds, is partially a result of hyperbolic discounting. In recent years, 
financial services marketers have recognized and effectively capitalized on this 
phenomenon.”); Cornelia Pechmann et al., Navigating the Central Tensions in 
Research on At-Risk Consumers: Challenges and Opportunities, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y 
& MARKETING 23, 26 (2011) (“The concept of targeting—creating combinations of 
product, pricing, distribution, and promotional elements to appeal to specific 
market segments—is central to the practices for-profit and social marketers 
employ.”). 
 67. See CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE 
FOR THE HIGH COST CREDIT MARKET 156−99 (2004) (discussing behavioural 
research and consumer finance markets); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373–76 (2004) (same); Estelami, supra note 66, at 274 
(same); Karen E. Francis, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics 
Analysis of the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 627–31 (2010) 
(same); Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 
 
“WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER” 911 
markets as driven by rationally comparing the value of one financial 
service product to others is highly inaccurate. While some borrowers 
make rational, self-interested, informed decisions on the value of 
each loan in comparison to its opportunity cost, many do not. At 
least seven common human psychological patterns create 
opportunities for predatory lenders to induce contracts that may not 
be in the best long-term interests of their borrowers.  
First, consumers from all walks of life systematically 
underestimate their exposure to human problems and overestimate 
their ability to make risk judgments. Because people have difficulty 
accepting their own vulnerability, most chronically underestimate 
their chances of heart attacks, asthma, lung cancer, being fired from 
a job, divorcing within five years after marriage, attempting suicide, 
and contracting a venereal disease.68 Workers overestimate their 
legal protections against employers’ arbitrary firings.69 Even 
                                                                                                     
AKRON L. REV. 725, 725–39 (2005) (same); Debra Pogrund Star & Jessica M. 
Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws and 
Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 85, 85–131 (2010) (same); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the 
Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 
707, 707–840 (2006) (same). 
 68. See, e.g., David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications 
for Health, Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCHOL. SC. PUB. INT. 69, 79–80 
(2004) (discussing humans’ general over-optimism that negative events will not 
happen to them). See generally SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS 8–11 
(1989) (discussing the concept of “[t]he self as hero” and explaining the evidence 
that “adults’ positive self-perceptions are unrealistic”); Neil D. Weinstein & 
Elizabeth Lachendro, Egocentrism as a Source of Unrealistic Optimism, 8 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 195, 195 (1982) (“People cannot accept their 
own vulnerability. They expect others to be robbed, injured, or divorced, but 
never think such misfortunes will happen to them.”); Neil D. Weinstein, 
Unrealistic Optimism about Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions 
From a Community-Wide Sample, J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 481 (1987) (discussing 
the results of a study on the  “tendency to claim that one is less at risk than 
one’s peers”); Neil D. Weinstein, Why It Won’t Happen To Me, 3 HEALTH PSYCH. 
431, 431 (1984) (stating that there is “evidence of unrealistic optimism in risk 
perceptions”). 
 69. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive 
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) (“Almost everyone thinks that 
his or her chances of having an auto accident, contracting a particular disease, 
or getting fired from a job are significantly lower than the average person’s 
chances of suffering these misfortunes; estimates range from twenty to eighty 
percent below the average person’s probability.”); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining 
with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perception of Legal Protection in 
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sophisticated managers are prone to treat decisions as unique, 
generating unreasonably optimistic forecasts by ignoring or 
minimizing past results.70 Moreover, even when consumers actually 
overestimate the probability of emergencies, they typically “think 
that they personally are peculiarly less susceptible to such events.”71 
Consumers tend to be unrealistically optimistic even when negative 
events have happened to them in the past and when a real, 
immediate, and visually vivid risk is present.72  
This natural tendency leaves borrowers systematically 
vulnerable to exploitative lending. The probability of many of the 
events that people tend to underestimate, such as sickness, divorce, 
and job loss, are precisely those events that are the leading causes of 
insolvency.73 Moreover, there is robust evidence that borrowers 
chronically underestimate the cost of credit, even in the face of price 
disclosures.74 Credit card borrowers tend to make foolish choices 
                                                                                                     
an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (“[W]orkers appear to 
systematically overestimate the protections afforded by law, believing that they 
have far greater rights against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they in fact 
have under an at-will contract.”). 
 70. See Marta P. Coelho, Unrealistic Optimism: Still a Neglected Trait, 25 
J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 397, 402–04 (2010) (discussing the effects of unrealistic 
optimism on “economic/managerial activities”); Daniel Kahneman & Dan 
Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk 
Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 17 (1993) (stating that those making decisions often 
“consider problems as unique” which causes them to ignore past results and 
make “overly optimistic forecasts”). 
 71. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1184 (1997). 
 72. See Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and 
Generalization of Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful 
Events: Reactions to the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 39 (1992) (discussing “unrealistic optimism” regarding the 
probability of being harmed by an earthquake); Peter Harris, Wendy Middleton 
& Mark Surman, Give ’em Enough Rope: Perceptions of Health and Safety Risks 
in Bungee Jumpers, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 68, 68 (1996) (discussing 
“unrealistic optimism” about the dangers of bungee jumping). 
 73. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS (2001) (discussing the causes of middle-
class bankruptcy). 
 74. See F. THOMAS JUSTER & ROBERT P. SHAY, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND 
ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 6–46 (1964) (discussing “consumer sensitivity to 
finance rates”); see also NAT’L COMM. ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 18–21 (1972) (discussing data that shows “some individual 
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about contractual terms because they are systematically, 
unrealistically optimistic about their future card use and personal 
circumstances.75 Federal Reserve Board researchers looking at data 
for the past thirty years in all demographic groups find credit 
cardholders’ opinions “about their own experiences are almost the 
reverse of their views about consumers’ experiences in general, 
suggesting considerable concern over the behavior of others and 
possibly a belief that ‘I can handle credit cards, but other people 
cannot.’”76 A study relying on point-of-sale interviews reports that 
triple- and quadruple-digit interest-rate payday loan borrowers 
were “hopelessly optimistic regarding when they expect to be able to 
repay the loan, particularly at the beginning of the relationship.”77 
Many lenders seek to exacerbate this tendency by “shrouding” 
interest rates—leading borrowers to make life-altering decisions 
with their biased intuitions, rather than careful financial 
reflection.78 
Second, many consumers tend to focus on the present benefits 
of their actions, while underestimating or ignoring longer-term 
drawbacks. People have an innate difficulty maintaining self-control 
in the face of immediate gratification. They tend to prefer a benefit 
that arrives sooner rather than later, in effect “discounting” the 
                                                                                                     
consumers have problems repaying their debts”); Jean Kinsey & Ray McAlister, 
Consumer Knowledge of the Costs of Open-End Credit, 15 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
249, 250 (1981) (explaining that “[s[tudies have shown that knowledge of the 
APR is not readily translated into knowledge about the dollar cost of credit”); 
Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Fuzzy Math, Disclosure Regulation, and 
Market Outcomes: Evidence from Truth-in-Lending Reform, 24 REV. OF FIN. 
STUDIES 506, 513 (2011) (“We define payment/interest bias as a tendency to 
underestimate an APR when attempting to calculate it based on other loan 
terms.”). 
 75. See Sha Yang, Livia Markoczy & Min Qi, Unrealistic Optimism in 
Consumer Credit Card Adoption, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 170, 171 (2007) (“In this 
paper, we study how such systematic judgment error, the unrealistic optimism 
(also called wishful thinking) regarding the future usage, impacts consumer 
decisions on consumer credit card adoption.”). 
 76. Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970–
2000, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 623, 628 (2000). 
 77. Nathalie Martin, 1000% Interest Rates—Good While Supplies Last: A 
Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 605 (2010). 
 78. Stango & Zinman, supra note 74, at 518 (discussing the practice of 
many lenders of “shrouding” interest rates). 
914 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012) 
value of the later reward.79 While there are large variations in the 
rates at which people discount the value of future benefits, decades 
of empirical research confirm a strong present bias among many 
consumers.80 This bias creates difficulty for consumers in 
attempting to order their financial affairs.81 The abstract nature of 
financial pricing makes self-control particularly difficult.82 For 
example, saving when an asset is highly liquid is hard.83 Employees 
are much more likely to accumulate retirement savings when 
automatically enrolled in 401(k) savings plans—illustrating the 
power of suggestion and inertia and the relatively minor role the 
cognitive process of opportunity cost comparison plays in actual 
financial decision-making.84 Rather than carefully weighing the 
serious long-term consequences of their borrowing, many debtors 
are irrationally “payment-myopic,” focusing on whether they can 
make bi-weekly or monthly payments instead of whether the 
contract as a whole is a wise decision. Because the negative aspects 
of debt occur in the future, these outcomes appear less problematic 
                                                                                                     
 79. Richard. H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic 
Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201 (1981). 
 80. See Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time 
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
351, 358 (2002) (discussing the “discounted utility” model of decision making). 
 81. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit 
Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 50 (1991) (“The failure of the competitive 
model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices 
without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest 
on their outstanding balance.” (citation omitted)); Philip Bond, David K. Musto 
& Bilge Yilmaz, Predatory Mortgage Lending, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 412, 413 (2009) 
(explaining that  “existing literature commonly attributes predatory lending to 
lender fraud and borrower misunderstanding,” and one version of this view  
“presents a model of payday lending in which a lender can, at cost, persuade 
borrowers to overestimate their future incomes”). 
 82. Adam Gifford, Jr., Emotion & Self-Control, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORGANIZATION 113, 113–14 (2002) (discussing the human problem of self-
control). 
 83. See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. 
ECON. 443, 446 (1997) (proposing “that financial market innovation reduces 
welfare by providing ‘too much’ liquidity”). 
 84. See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: 
Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1149 
(2001) (analyzing the change in employee savings after 401(k) enrollment 
became automatic). 
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than they actually will be.85 Payday and car-title loan borrowers 
face difficult self-control challenges each time a balloon payment 
comes due. Because renewing loans is so much easier than retiring 
the entire debt, borrowers must overcome the temptation to renew 
their loan each time in order to step off the debt treadmill.86 
Third, consumer lending markets are likely to be distorted by 
distressed abbreviated reasoning patterns. Psychologists report that 
consumers who are suffering from emotional distress, 
embarrassment, desperation, or fear frequently make poor decisions 
regarding values and risk.87 People’s impulse control breaks down 
when they face emotional distress.88 Most people have limited 
attention capacity. When they use this attention to cope with a 
stressor, many consumers use truncated reasoning to quickly escape 
the stressful situation by seizing on the first minimally acceptable 
option available to them.89 Because many consumers are in the 
market to borrow money precisely to deal with some financial 
threat, they are likely to lack the attention required to resist the 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Gretchen B. Chapman, Temporal Discounting and Utility for 
Health and Money, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & 
COGNITION 771, 771 (1996) (explaining that in a study on “health and money 
intertemporal choices,” researchers found “a delay effect (smaller discount rates 
for long delays) and a magnitude effect (smaller discount rates for large 
magnitude outcomes)”). 
 86. Francis, supra note 67, at 628 (discussing the rollover temptation 
inherent in payday loans). 
 87. See Roy F. Baumeister, Esteem Threat, Self-Regulatory Breakdown, 
and Emotional Distress as Factors in Self-Defeating Behavior, 1 REV. GEN. 
PSYCHOL. 145, 145 (1997) (studying self-defeating behavior); Karen Pezza Leith 
& Roy F. Baumeister, Why Do Bad Moods Increase Self-Defeating Behavior? 
Emotion, Risk Taking, and Self-Regulation, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1250, 1250 (1996) (“Our hypothesis is that negative affect causes people to make 
choices in a way that leads to nonoptimal courses of action: Specifically, one that 
may indeed hold out the chance of some highly positive outcome but also carries 
substantial risks or costs.”). 
 88. See Diane M. Tice, Ellen Bratslavsky & Roy F. Baumeister, Emotional 
Distress Regulation Takes Precedence Over Impulse Control: If You Feel Bad, Do 
It!, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (2001) (stating that emotional 
distress is “detrimental to behavioral self-control”). 
 89. See Giora Keinan, Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of 
Alternatives Under Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 639 (1987) (discussing the effect of stress on decision-
making); Willis, supra note 67, at 739 (discussing “truncated reasoning” and its 
effect in stressful situations). 
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temptation of a temporary financial “quick-fix.” Moreover, the most 
vulnerable loan applicants tend to have problematic credit histories, 
which lead them to evaluate loan pricing while fearing the 
embarrassment and rejection. These conditions are likely to inhibit 
loan applicants’ ability to adjust their perceptions of price as they 
learn about loan terms.90 
Fourth, even those borrowers who are not shopping for credit 
under distress have great difficulty understanding and comparing 
credit prices. Research shows that consumers tend to reduce the 
amount of effort they expend on making sound decisions when those 
decisions become more complex—a phenomenon known as 
information overload.91 When faced with complex credit price 
disclosures and boilerplate contracts, borrowers tend to focus on 
only a few salient aspects of the decision, or even fail to try to 
understand the information at all.92 Moreover, when borrowers lack 
experience or understanding of financial and legal terms of loan 
contracts, the opportunity cost of comparison shopping from 
multiple creditors can be quite high, suggesting that careful 
comparison may not even be rational for borrowers who have 
literacy and numeracy challenges.93 The U.S. Department of 
Education’s most recent national survey of adult literacy finds that 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Karim S. Kassam, Katrina Koslov & Wendy Berry Mendes, 
Decisions Under Distress: Stress Profiles Influence Anchoring and Adjustment, 
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1394, 1394 (2009) (studying how people make decisions under 
stress). 
 91. See Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and 
Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and 
Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57, 57 (2005) (“Research in the decision-
making literature suggests that consumers tend to reduce the amount of effort 
they expend when decisions become more complex.” (citations omitted)); John 
W. Payne & James R. Bettman, When Time Is Money: Decision Behavior Under 
Opportunity-Cost Time Pressure, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PRESSURE 131, 131 (1996) (“This paper investigates decision processes in 
environments where there is time stress due to the opportunity cost of delaying 
decisions.”). 
 92. Jeffrey Davis, Protection Consumers from Overdisclosure and 
Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consume-Credit 
Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 842 (1977) (explaining that despite extensive 
creditor disclosure requirements, studies show that “much remains to be done” 
to protect consumers). 
 93. PETERSON, supra note 67, at 131 (“The costs of acquiring information 
must be evaluated relative to the resources of credit shoppers.”). 
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22% of American adults lack even the most basic quantitative 
literacy skills.94 These citizens have difficulty performing basic 
quantitative tasks, such as using or understanding numbers 
included in print materials. Thus, they are systematically 
vulnerable to deceptive and misleading credit pricing tactics.95 
Indeed, at least one analysis of the subprime mortgage crisis reports 
a strong correlation between numerical ability and foreclosure.96 
Fifth, the language, terminology, and marketing practices used 
to present credit contracts can strongly influence how borrowers 
perceive prices. Compelling evidence suggests that the way pricing 
and risk information is presented, or “framed,” can consistently 
influence human choices.97 For example, people are more averse to 
medical treatments when identical risk data are framed as a 
mortality rate than when framed as a survival rate.98 Consumers 
treat identical investment risks differently depending on whether 
                                                                                                     
 94. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 
OF ADULT LITERACY (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/naal. 
 95. See Gerard Caprio, Jr., The Great Innumeracy Epidemic, 11 FIN. 
REGULATOR 37, 37 (2007) (discussing the effect of illiteracy on individuals’ 
financial decisions); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and 
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 260–62 (2002) (“[R]esearch suggests that 
disclosure statements accompanying consumer contracts, however well 
designed, may not be able to aid most consumers in understanding the terms of 
their agreements.”). 
 96. Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette & Stephan Meier, Financial 
Literacy and Subprime Mortgage Delinquency: Evidence from a Survey Matched 
to Administrative Data (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2010-
10, 2010). 
 97. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and 
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981) (“Because of imperfections of 
human perception and decision, however, changes of perspective often reverse 
the relative apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of options.”). 
 98. See Barbara J. McNeil, Stephen G. Pauker, Harold C. Sox, Jr. & Amos 
Tversky, On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1260 (1982) (“Recent work by cognitive psychologists on the 
framing of decision problems indicates that the characterization of outcomes in 
terms of the probability of survival rather than the probability of death can have 
a substantial effect on people’s preferences.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, 
S254–55 (1986) (explaining a study where “[t]he same statistics were presented 
to some respondents in terms of mortality rates and to others in terms of 
survival rates” and respondents were asked which treatment they would prefer). 
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they are presented as a gamble or insurance.99 These patterns exist 
and can be manipulated in consumer financial services markets. For 
example, “[i]ndividuals will perceive a penalty for using credit cards 
as a loss and a bonus for using cash as a gain; this will lead 
individuals to use cash if and only if the ‘penalty’ tack is taken, 
although the two situations are, from an economic and end-state 
perspective, identical.”100 Payday lenders prefer to describe their 
loan prices as a percentage of the loan principal, rather than with a 
simple nominal annual interest rate because, for example, 
borrowers are likely to perceive a two-week loan with a price of 15% 
of the amount financed as less expensive than the same loan with a 
391% simple nominal annual interest rate—even though these 
prices are in fact identical.101 
Moreover, people tend to rely too heavily on first impressions 
when assessing risk and value.102 This is to say, people tend to 
“anchor” on early estimates and fail to sufficiently revise their 
perception of price or risk when further information comes to 
light.103 For example, research suggests anchoring on the early 
                                                                                                     
 99. See John C. Hershey & Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Risk Taking and 
Problem Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis, 47 J. 
RISK & INS. 111, 111 (1980) (examining “the extent to which . . . risk preferences 
are influenced by problem context”). 
 100. Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer, 
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, in 
BEHAV. LAW & ECON. 259, 262 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 101. Peterson, supra note 7, at 1154 (explaining that although “there is no 
objective mathematical difference between a typical payday loan limited in price 
with a 391% annual percentage rate cap and one limited with a cap of 15% of 
the loan principal,” consumers often perceive the annual percentage cap as 
higher). 
 102. See Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A 
Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 Q.J. ECON. 37, 37 (1999) (“Psychological 
research indicates that people have a cognitive bias that leads them to 
misinterpret new information as supporting previously held hypotheses.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under 
Ambiguity, in RATIONAL CHOICE 41, 46–51 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. 
Reder eds., 1987) (explaining the “anchoring-and-adjustment strategy in which 
an initial probability is used as the anchor (or starting point) and adjustments 
are made for ambiguity”); Robin M. Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional 
and Dysfunctional Aspects of Judgmental Heuristics, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 197, 
206 (1981) (explaining that the “adjustment and anchoring heuristic” is 
characterized by “[s]ubjects [who] are assumed to fix (i.e., anchor) on the 
probability of one elementary event but fail to adjust sufficiently for the other 
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estimate of the value of a lawsuit tends to disrupt later settlement 
negotiation.104 Even accountants conducting audits anchor on early 
estimates and insufficiently correct their judgments.105 Marketing 
professionals have absorbed these lessons and systematically design 
sales tactics to exploit this pattern in judgment making.106 
Sixth, an impressive body of empirical research indicates most 
people are irrationally averse to losses. The classical economic 
account of rational decision-making suggests individuals should 
value their out-of-pocket costs in the same manner as they value 
forgone opportunities. This is to say, people should not be more 
displeased with losses than they are pleased with equivalent gains. 
But, some data indicate consumers are actually roughly twice as 
displeased with losses as they are pleased with equivalent gains.107 
A related tendency makes consumers willing to assume an 
                                                                                                     
events” (citation omitted)); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128–30 (1974) 
(discussing “adjustment and anchoring” which occurs when “people make 
estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final 
answer”); Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of 
Economics, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 137, 152 (1991) (“[B]ecause of the 
mind’s limited information processing and storage capabilities, humans must 
use simple rules of thumb and heuristics to help make decisions and solve 
problems.”). 
 104. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A 
Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 54–56 (Kenneth 
J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (explaining the role of initial reference points in 
settlement negotiations). 
 105. See William R. Kinney Jr. & Wilfred C. Uecker, Mitigating the 
Consequences of Anchoring in Auditor Judgments, 57 ACCT. REV. 55, 55 (1982) 
(“The present study reports the results of an experiment involving two audit 
tasks in which the judgments of audit seniors are biased consistent with their 
use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic.” (citation omitted)). 
 106. See Estelami, supra note 66, at 279 (discussing areas that financial 
programs should address); Brian Wansink, Robert J. Kent & Stephen J. Hoch, 
An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase Quantity Decisions, 35 J. 
MARKETING RES. 71, 72 (1998) (suggesting “that a simple anchoring and 
adjustment judgment process adequately describes how consumers make 
[purchasing] decisions” and “that marketers can influence quantity decisions 
through anchors provided at the point of purchase”); Star & Choplin, supra note 
67, at 97 (discussing “anchoring” as one type of “social psychological 
phenomen[on] that prevent[s] [creditors’] disclosures from being effective”). 
 107. See PETERSON, supra note 67, at 175 (“Some data indicates consumers 
are actually roughly twice as displeased with losses as they are pleased with 
equivalent gains.”). 
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objectively inordinate amount of risk when facing the loss of 
something they already possess.108 For example, people who have 
owned antique furniture or vintage wine for a long period of time 
commonly refuse to sell their possessions for prices far greater than 
market value—even though they could buy a replacement and 
pocket the difference.109 Some economists explain this is because the 
owners have “endowed” their possessions with personal value.110 
Similarly, many firms sell products with “a thirty day trial offer” 
with a “no questions money back guarantee,” where the consumer 
does not have to pay until after the temporary period expires. The 
seller realizes the buyer will pay a higher price after endowing the 
product with personal value, or, stated differently, the buyer will 
pay more to avoid losing a product they already have. By holding on 
too tightly to the things they possess, many consumers exhibit a 
classically irrational bias for preserving the status quo.111 In the 
high-cost credit market, lenders have learned to exploit loss 
aversion. For example, car-title lenders, also called “auto pawn” 
companies, often extract more payment out of consumers who do not 
want to lose their cars than the cars themselves are worth.112 
Similarly, homeowners who have fallen behind on mortgage 
                                                                                                     
 108. See id. (“A related tendency makes consumers willing to assume an 
objectively inordinate amount of risk when facing the loss of something they 
already possess.”). 
 109. See id. at 175–76 (“For example, people who have owned antique 
furniture or vintage wine for a significant period of time commonly refuse to sell 
their possessions for prices far greater than market value— even though they 
could buy a replacement and pocket the difference.”). 
 110. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 
1326 (1990) (discussing the “endowment effect” on individuals which occurs 
when they own a good for a certain period of time); Cynthia E. Devers, Robert 
M. Wiseman & R. Michael Holmes, The Effects of Endowment and Loss Aversion 
in Managerial Stock Option Valuation, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 191, 194 (2007) 
(discussing the “status quo bias” which is “a preference for the current state that 
biases the economist against both buying and selling” a good that he has owned 
for some time). 
 111. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSPS. 193 (1991). 
 112. See PETERSON, supra note 67, at 175 (“A related tendency makes 
consumers willing to assume an objectively inordinate amount of risk when 
facing the loss of something they already possess.”). 
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payments will often agree to onerous terms refinancing their homes 
in order to avoid foreclosure.  
Finally, credit contracts generally, and high-interest consumer 
financial products in particular, have the potential to exacerbate the 
harm of addictive and compulsive consumer behavior. A reality in 
modern life is that many Americans suffer from addictions and 
compulsive behavior. The problems of alcoholism, pathological 
gambling, and compulsive shopping all have the potential to be 
negatively interrelated with consumer credit.113 Addicted and 
compulsive consumers can use exhaustion of their financial 
resources as a self-control mechanism—terminating a gambling 
binge, for example, once the consumer has no more money left.114 
Consumer credit, particularly when offered on predatory terms, can 
create the constant possibility of relapse. Market forces do not 
protect this large and vulnerable segment of the population from 
onerous debt problems. 
Collectively, these behavioral patterns suggest a very different 
picture of the free market than the portrait painted by advocates of 
weak law. Marketing academics have long recognized that 
aggressive advertisers can leverage these heterogeneously 
distributed behavioral patterns by targeting inefficient 
consumers.115 Unlike the homogeneous pricing of most goods, 
                                                                                                     
 113. See, e.g., Ronald J. Faber & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Compulsive 
Consumption and Credit Abuse, 11 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 97, 99 (1988) (explaining 
that “compulsive consumption” is a “psychological factor” that likely contributes 
to excessive debt); Henry R. Lesieur, Compulsive Gambling, 29 SOCIETY 43, 45 
(1992) (discussing debt caused by gambling addictions); Howard Tokunaga, The 
Use and Abuse of Consumer Credit: Application of Psychological Theory and 
Research, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 285, 287 (1993) (explaining that “compulsive 
buying,” which is defined as “a chronic inability to refrain from spending money” 
often leads to “severe financial and psychological hardship” (citation omitted)). 
 114. Florida Council on Compulsive Gambling, Gambling on Credit: 
Exploring the Link Between Compulsive Gambling and Access to Credit 19 (May 
2006), available at http://gamblinghelp.org/media/.download_gallery/Gambling 
%20on%20Credit.pdf (finding that “easy access to credit accelerates the problem 
and process of a gambling addiction, increasing the likelihood that compulsive 
gamblers will gamble more often, incurring higher levels of debt, and ultimately 
inviting more severe personal and financial consequences when their resources 
are exhausted.”). 
 115. Terri L. Rittenburg & Madhavan Parthasarathy, Ethical Implications 
of Target Market Selection, 17 J. MACROMARKETING 49 (1997) (“One implication 
may be another form of market segmentation, or an additional dimension for 
 
922 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012) 
consumer loans are underwritten to the needs and abilities of 
individual borrowers, giving lenders the opportunity to 
heterogeneously price loans based on the inabilities and 
misunderstanding of loan applicants. In many markets, shoppers 
discern pricing and quality. But in consumer finance markets, 
lenders can segment the market based on consumer vulnerability, 
rather than on product quality.116 
In addition to behavioral research, some scholars have 
attempted to explore the welfare effects of small, high-cost consumer 
loans.117 However, this research is notoriously difficult for a variety 
of reasons. First, it is difficult for these studies to account for all 
borrowers. Borrowers are often embarrassed and confused 
regarding their financial circumstances and are reluctant or unable 
to self-report their difficulties.118 Those who use small, high-cost 
consumer loans may change jobs and relocate more often than more 
affluent families, which introduces difficulties with tracking 
borrowers long-term.119 Payday and car-title lenders typically do not 
report their borrowers’ repayment patterns with the national credit 
bureaus, and many borrowers in this market are not plugged into 
                                                                                                     
identifying subsegments: taking product category and vulnerability of 
consumers into consideration. This method may be useful in marketing, not only 
socially desirable products, but also potentially harmful products.”). 
 116. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 
92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 767 n.78 (2008) (“If market segmentation based on the 
level or type of misperception is possible, then sellers will design their products 
and pricing schemes in response to consumer misperception even when the 
average bias is zero.”); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME 
VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 22 (2011) 
(“[L]endors could ‘prescreen for vulnerability,’ picking out people they could 
most easily dupe.” (citations omitted)). 
 117. See infra notes 127–52 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost 
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. 
REV. 807. 897 (2003) (“Sharing word of mouth criticism of high-cost lenders 
often means exposing embarrassing financial problems.” (citations omitted)). 
 119. Cf. Payday Loans, Inc.: Short on Credit, Long on Debt, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3–4 (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Payday Loans, Inc.], 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-
analysis/payday-loan-inc.pdf (acknowledging the lack of long-term studies of 
payday-loan borrowers and providing data from a two-year study of borrowers 
in Oklahoma—one of only eleven states with a consolidated database tracking 
system that allows this long-term research). 
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the mainstream economy in the same way as more affluent 
people.120  
Second, it is challenging for studies to separate the welfare 
effects of small, high-cost consumer loans with the effects of other 
financial stressors and demographic forces in borrowers’ lives. Many 
studies do not account for local, regional, and national changes in 
labor markets; the effects of the housing bubble and crisis over the 
past fifteen years; and the complex dynamics of other social forces 
that affect low- and moderate-income communities, such as crime, 
drug addiction, divorce rates, the number of dependents per wage 
earner, educational levels, educational quality, military service, and 
racial discrimination.121 Factors such as the fluctuating cost of 
gasoline, the rising price of health care, and the declining access to 
health insurance—all of which exist across complex temporal, 
spatial, legal, and social patterns—profoundly affect many families. 
Studies of payday and car-title lending must also contend with 
causal noise created by other forms of credit, asset accumulation, 
and asset protection, including credit cards, bounce-protection 
plans, pawnshops, installment loans, negotiating delayed payments 
with creditors, credit union programs, peer-to-peer online lending, 
family support networks, saving accounts, and the ability of 
borrowers to evade creditor collection remedies.  
Third, many studies fail to account for the differences in 
unsecured creditor remedies in various legal jurisdictions. The 
growing use of payday loans offered—both legally and illegally—
over the Internet distorts the effect of laws regulating small-loan 
markets.122 Even in states where the state government is 
                                                                                                     
 120. See Katy Jacob, Reaching Deeper: Using Alternative Data Sources to 
Increase the Efficacy of Credit Scoring, THE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION 6 
(Mar. 2006), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/imported/ 
managed_documents/alternative_credit_scoring.pdf (“[T]raditional credit 
reporting agencies do not track or score payday loan payments, and payday 
lenders tend to report only poor payment history . . . . As a result, payday loan 
users have difficulty graduating to more mainstream and less expensive 
credit.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Payday Loans, Inc., supra note 119, at 9 (finding, without 
controlling for outside factors, that borrowers’ debts typically increase over 
time). 
 122. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 855, 869 n.53 (2007) (finding only three of eight online payday lenders that 
identify which state’s law applies); Jean Ann Fox & Anna Petrini, Internet 
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attempting to collect useful data, many members of the small-loan 
industry actively evade these reporting requirements as well as the 
consumer protection laws that generally go along with them.123 The 
civil justice system does not generally provide useful information 
about this market because the size of the loans often makes 
litigation cost-prohibitive from borrowers’ perspectives.124 Many 
payday and car-title lenders have arbitration agreements that force 
borrowers into private dispute resolution.125 And most of all, the 
people who could supply the information to overcome these 
hurdles—payday and car-title lenders themselves—generally refuse 
to release their loan data.126 
Nevertheless, in recent years researchers have released a 
growing number of papers, some of which have been published, that 
purport to show both beneficial and harmful effects of payday 
lending.127 While a complete exposition of this growing body of 
                                                                                                     
Payday Lending: How High-Priced Lenders Use the Internet to Mire Borrowers 
in Debt and Evade State Consumer Protections, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. 4, 7–10 
(Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Internet_ 
Payday_Lending113004.PDF (providing data about online lenders that evade 
state laws). 
 123. See, e.g., Jean Ann Fox, Unsafe and Unsound: Payday Lenders Hide 
Behind FDIC Bank Charters to Peddle Usury, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. 7–9, 13–
14, 17, 23 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/ 
www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/pdlrentabankreport.pdf (detailing various 
ways in which payday lenders evade consumer protection laws and reporting 
requirements). 
 124. See, e.g., Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep’s 
Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic 
Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1587 (2005) (“Consumer loans involve such 
small amounts that bringing these cases on an individual basis is cost 
prohibitive.”). 
 125. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory 
Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2002) (providing data about payday lender 
arbitration clauses). 
 126. See, e.g., id. at 40–47 (providing data on Ohio payday lenders who 
refuse to disclose loan data). 
 127. See generally Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, 
Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring Puzzles?, 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14659, Jan. 2009), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14659.pdf (analyzing “household 
choices between liabilities [on balance sheets] and . . . the informational content 
of prime and subprime credit scores in the consumer credit market”); Dennis 
Campbell, Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez & Peter Tufano, Bouncing Out of the 
Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures, 
 
“WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER” 925 
literature is beyond the scope of this Article, a few examples are 
helpful. For instance, the payday lending industry has widely 
distributed an unpublished working paper written by Donald 
Morgan and Michael Strain.128 Morgan and Strain conclude that the 
reimposition of traditional interest rate limits in North Carolina and 
                                                                                                     
(Dec. 3, 2008) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1335873 (analyzing the determinants of involuntary 
checking and debit account closures); Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In 
Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military Personnel Performance (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 08-18, Aug. 1, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1269414 (finding that “payday 
loan access causes financial distress and severe misbehavior” for some Air Force 
personnel); Susan Payne Carter, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, 
Pecuniary Mistakes? Payday Borrowing by Credit Union Members, (Pension 
Research Council, Working Paper No. 2010-32, Nov. 11, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1707657 (examining patterns of 
a credit union member’s financial choices, including a high level of payday 
borrowing); Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 28 
(2011), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X 
11000870 (discussing the effect of the availability of payday loans on the welfare of 
communities after natural disasters); Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do 
Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? (Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 11-
13, Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/ 
J.Tobacman.pdf (estimating “the causal impact of access to payday loans on 
bankruptcy filings”); Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Payday Holiday: 
Households Fare After Payday Credit Bans (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report 
No. 309, 2008) [hereinafter Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday], available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr309.pdf (offering data to 
contradict negative critiques of payday lending); Michael A. Stegman & Robert 
Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 
ECON. DEV. Q. 8 (2003), available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/CC_Payday_ 
lending.2.2003.pdf (exploring the rapidly growing supply and demand for payday 
credit and how it leads to chronic borrowers); Petru S. Stoianovici & Michael T. 
Maloney, Restrictions on Credit: A Public Policy Analysis of Payday Lending (Oct. 
28, 2008) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1291278 (finding “no empirical evidence that payday lending leads to 
more bankruptcy filings”); Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: 
Household Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 546 (2010), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jzinman/Papers/ 
Zinman_RestrictingAccess_jbf_forth.pdf (arguing that restricting access to 
expensive credit harms consumers, on average, more than it helps them). 
 128. See, e.g., Donald Rieck, “Predatory Reporting” on Payday Lending, 
ADVANCE AMERICA CASH ADVANCE (July 18, 2008), http://www.advance 
america.net/about-us/media-details/152 (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (referencing 
the Morgan and Strain paper) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday, supra note 127 (offering data to 
contradict negative critiques of payday lending). 
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Georgia led to greater rates of bounced checks than the national 
average, more complaints to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
about lenders and debt collectors, and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing 
at rates greater than the national average.129 Consumer advocates 
at the Center for Responsible Lending, however, aggressively 
challenged the study’s methods.130 With respect to the bounced-
check claim, Morgan and Strain used regional data from the Federal 
Reserve’s regional check-processing centers (CPCs) as proxies for 
North Carolina’s and Georgia’s bounced-check rates.131 But each of 
these regional CPCs also processes returned checks from other 
states, including states with legal and rapidly growing payday-
lending industries during the study period, and the data do not 
purely represent North Carolina’s or Georgia’s returned-check 
rates.132 Moreover, the study did not control for the other 
independent, regionally related factors that could have accounted 
for a very small reported increase in bounced checks across the 
region including, for example, Hurricane Katrina.133 With respect to 
FTC complaints, the Center for Responsible Lending pointed out 
that the study did not account for the generally rising FTC 
complaint rates prior to the study period nor the fact that complaint 
rates are likely driven by the growing unrelated problem of identity 
theft.134 Even more problematic was the study’s useless bankruptcy 
data, which did not control for other independent variables that 
“greatly influence a person’s chances of filing for bankruptcy 
protection, including health insurance coverage, foreclosures, 
                                                                                                     
 129. For their conclusion, see Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday, supra note 
127, at 26. 
 130. See CRL Critique of “Payday Holiday: How Households Fare After 
Payday Credit Bans” by Donald P. Morgan and Michael R. Strain, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1–4 (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter CRL Critique], available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/states/crl-
morgan-critique-12-10.pdf (arguing that “Morgan and Strain’s data and 
research methods are not adequate to support [their] findings or overall 
conclusion”). 
 131. See Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday, supra note 127, at 3 (discussing 
use of CPCs); CRL Critique, supra note 130, at 2 (describing CPCs as proxies). 
 132. CRL Critique, supra note 130, at 2. 
 133. See id. (stating the possible effects of factors such as Hurricane 
Katrina). 
 134. Id. at 3.  
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divorce rates, [and] demographic factors such as income.”135 Despite 
all these shortcomings (as well as the authors’ disclaimer that their 
findings were “preliminary” and shared “solely to stimulate 
discussion”),136 the Morgan and Strain paper remains notable 
because industry lobbyists have so frequently supplied the piece to 
state legislatures and quoted it in the press that it remains the most 
prominently discussed proxy welfare variable study to date.137 
In contrast, Brian Melzer’s more recent study published in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics measures the effects of payday loan 
availability on borrower well-being.138 Using a clever study design, 
Melzer focused on families from states that effectively banned 
payday lending, but the families nonetheless had access to payday 
loans because they lived just over the border of a state that allowed 
payday lending.139 This allowed Melzer to compare families that had 
cross-border access to payday loans with similar families that did 
not have access to payday loans.140 Melzer measured borrower well-
being with self-reported variables, including postponed medical 
care, postponed dental care, and postponed prescription drug 
purchases; difficulty paying mortgage, rent, or utility bills; moving 
out of one’s home due to financial difficulties; inability to afford 
meals; and going without telephone service.141 Melzer conducted a 
variety of different regressions to discover whether access to payday 
loans caused an increase in hardship, including one focusing on 
differences in payday loan access over time and another focusing on 
different income groups—both of which confirmed his baseline 
                                                                                                     
 135. Id.  
 136. Morgan & Strain, Payday Holiday, supra note 127, at cover page. 
 137. See, e.g., Rieck, supra note 128 (referencing the Morgan and Strain 
paper); John Payne, Good Intentions Don’t Always Make Good Policy, THE 
JOPLIN GLOBE (June 27, 2010), http://www.joplinglobe.com/editorial/x1617 
565386/John-Payne-guest-columnist-Good-intentions-don-t-always-make-good-
policy (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (referencing the Morgan and Strain paper) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 138. See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the 
Payday Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 517 (2011), available at 
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/126/1/517.full.pdf (estimating the “real 
effects of credit access among low-income households”). 
 139. Id. at 518–19. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 525–26. 
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results “that payday credit access is associated with greater 
hardship among families with $15,000 to $50,000 of annual 
income.”142 Melzer found evidence that families with access to 
payday loans were more likely to have difficulty paying their bills, to 
have to skip meals, and to live without access to a telephone.143 His 
results suggest, for example, that the likelihood of reporting 
difficulty paying bills increases by 25% for families with access to 
payday loans.144 Melzer also found that families with access to 
payday loans were more likely to suffer health-related hardship by 
postponing medical care, dental care, and prescription drug 
purchases.145 
Similarly, Kurbin, Squires, and Graves recently published a 
study in the Journal of Criminology and Public Policy showing that 
a greater density of payday-lending locations causes an increase in 
local crime rates.146 The study compared payday-lender locations to 
reported violent- and property-crime rates in census tracts within 
the Seattle area, regressing for a broad array of independent 
variables that included the percentage of secondary sector low-wage 
jobs, the jobless rate, the percentage of employed people working as 
professionals or managers, the percentage of high school graduates, 
the poverty rate, the percentage of black people, the percentage of 
young males, the residential instability index, the percentage of 
                                                                                                     
 142. Id. at 534, 537–47. In addition to his regressions, Melzer also conducted 
two falsification exercises to test whether his results held true in income groups 
that do not commonly use payday loans. Melzer’s falsification tests showed that 
geographic access to payday loans had no effect on individuals who do not use 
payday loans because they either had such minimal income they cannot qualify 
for payday loans or because their income was so high they have access to 
cheaper forms of credit. Id. at 534–37. These tests further strengthen Melzer’s 
case that his regressions capture a causal effect of payday-loan access. 
 143. See id. at 532–33 (indicating a strong increase in families’ likelihood to 
have difficulty paying bills, and a mild increase in likelihood to cut meals or to 
live without a telephone, when the families have access to payday loans). 
 144. Id. at 534. 
 145. Id. at 550. 
 146. Charis E. Kubrin, Gregory D. Squires, Steven M. Graves & Graham C. 
Ousey, Does Fringe Banking Exacerbate Neighborhood Crime Rates? 
Investigating the Social Ecology of Payday Lending, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 437, 457 (2011), available at  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ 
j.1745-9133.2011.00719.x/pdf (studying the link between payday lending sites 
and neighborhood crime rates). 
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female-headed households, and population—all of which have been 
shown to be related to community crime rates.147 This study 
attempted to account for multicollinearity between the independent 
variables, spatial autocorrelation, and endogeneity between crime 
and payday lender density. In three different regression models, the 
study found that “payday lending is significantly associated with 
both violent and property crime rates. This relationship holds even 
after controlling for a host of factors typically associated with 
neighborhood crime rates.”148 The study asserts that payday lending 
imposes “broader community costs . . . that all residents pay when 
they reside in neighborhoods with a concentration of payday 
lenders.”149 Taking one specific example of just such a community 
cost, the study points out that much research has shown a strong 
relationship between crime rates and property value,150 which 
suggests that payday lending locations may depress property 
values.151 This claim will not surprise the many local government 
leaders around the country who have frequently asserted the same 
point.152 
While the social science is by no means unanimous, the best 
evidence suggests that small, high-cost loans are harmful to 
                                                                                                     
 147. Id. at 444–46. 
 148. Id. at 456. 
 149. Id. at 457. 
 150. Id. at 458 (citing David R. Bowes & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Identifying the 
Effects of Rail Transit Stations on Residential Property Values, 50 J. URBAN 
ECON. 1 (2001); Steve Gibbons, The Costs of Urban Property Crime, 114 ECON. J. 
F441 (2004); Richard H. Thaler, A Note on the Value of Crime Control: Evidence 
from the Property Market, 5 J. URBAN ECON. 137 (1978)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., Joel Davies, Editorial, Some Firms Hurt Neighborhoods, 
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 4, 2009, at 07B, available at http://docs. 
newsbank.com/s/InfoWeb/aggdocs/AWNB/12DC0E8731B34440/D0C690B70D3F
4E599FDEF466B2BF232D?p_multi=OWHB&s_lang=en-US (“When zoning laws 
enable predatory businesses to fill in the empty storefronts of our 
neighborhoods, we see increased crime, decreased property values and 
neighbors afraid to walk outside their doors after dark. Predatory businesses[,] 
like payday loan operations[,] . . . prey on those whose ties to society already are 
weakened.”); Annysa Johnson, Payday Loan Stores in Crosshairs: Tosa Imposes 
One-Year Moratorium While It Studies Permanent Restrictions, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2006, at B6 (“Wauwatosa’s moratorium is in response to 
neighbors’ complaints that the . . . [payday loan] store would attract crime and 
lower property values.”). 
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borrowers and their communities on balance.153 Given the 
complexity of the research, local government leaders can be excused 
for trusting their instincts, their values, and their own common 
sense. We have a long legacy of many of our most respected leaders 
and profound thinkers rejecting the notion that consumer lending 
markets are naturally efficient. For example, while the Founding 
Fathers were passionately committed to the value of freedom, they 
had virtually no confidence in the inherent efficiency of financial 
markets. President George Washington, the Father of Our Country, 
explained:  
[T]here is no practice more dangerous than borrowing 
money . . . for when money can be had in this way, repayment is 
seldom thought of in time . . . [.] Exertions to raise it by dint of 
industry ceases. It comes easy and is spent freely and many 
things indulged in that would never be thought of, if to be 
purchased by the sweat of the brow. In the mean time, the debt is 
accumulating like a snowball in rolling.154  
Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of 
Independence,155 famously feared banks more than he feared 
standing armies.156 And Benjamin Franklin, an advocate of the Bill 
of Rights, wrote: 
                                                                                                     
 153. See Regulatory Restructuring and Reform of the Financial System: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. app. 159 (2008) 
(prepared statement of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia University) 
(providing testimony of Professor Stiglitz, a Nobel-Prize-winning economist, 
that “[e]xploitive practices of the financial sector need to be curbed”). Professor 
Stiglitz further explained:  
The financial sector realized that there was money at the bottom of 
the pyramid, and they moved with all speed to ensure that it moved 
to the top. The exploitive practices include pay-day loans, predatory 
lending, and rent-a-furniture and similar scams. There needs to be a 
usury law (and this also applies to credit cards) limiting the effective 
rate of interest paid by users of the financial facility.  
Id. 
 154. RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 108 (2010). 
 155. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EXHIBITION (July 
22, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/jeffdec.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2012) (“Jefferson retained his prominent role in writing [the Declaration of 
Independence.]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 156. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in 11 THE 
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON IN TWELVE VOLUMES, FEDERAL EDITION 533 
(Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1905), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/ 
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[T]hink what you do when you run in debt; you give to another 
power over your liberty. . . . 
. . . When you have got your bargain, you may, perhaps, think 
little of payment; but creditors . . . have better memories than 
debtors . . . . The day comes round before you are aware, and the 
demand is made before you are prepared to satisfy it, or if you 
bear your debt in mind, the term which at first seemed so long 
will, as it lessens, appear extremely short. Time will seem to have 
added wings to his heels as well as shoulders. . . . The borrower is 
a slave to the lender, and the debtor to the creditor, disdain the 
chain, preserve your freedom; and maintain your independency: 
be industrious and free; be frugal and free.157 
The United States of America was founded on the shoulders of 
leaders who refused to tolerate abusive loans.  
Indeed, Adam Smith himself lacked confidence in the efficiency 
of consumer finance markets. Instead of relying on his own insights 
into naturally efficient markets, Smith emphasized the importance 
of the overconfidence bias in financial decision-making, stating that 
“[t]he over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of 
their own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers 
and moralists of all ages. . . . The chance of gain is by every man 
more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by most men 
under-valued . . . .”158 Indeed, in his great treatise, The Wealth of 
Nations, Adam Smith argued that behavioral patterns such as 
overconfidence bias and hyperbolic discounting made usury limits 
indispensible.159 In his words, high interest rate limits allow money 
to be lent to “prodigals and projectors” that are “likely to waste and 
destroy” capital overall.160 Instead, Smith argued that usury limits 
should be set “somewhat above . . . the lowest market rate.”161 With 
                                                                                                     
807/0054-11_Bk.pdf (“And I sincerely believe, with you, that banking 
establishments are more dangerous than standing armies . . . .”). 
 157. Benjamin Franklin, The Way to Wealth, in 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY 
OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 213, 217–18 (Nina Baym et al. eds., Shorter 4th ed. 
1995) (1733). 
 158. ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 124 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994) (1776). 
 159. See id. at 388 (arguing for a rate limit to protect borrowers). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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respect to high-cost loans, the inventor of the invisible hand did not 
believe in the invisible hand.162 
IV. Zoning in the Void: The Local Response to Predatory Small 
Loans 
Like Adam Smith, many local government leaders believe 
states should enact usury laws to limit prices in the market for 
small consumer loans. To this effect, many local governments feel 
compelled to fill the void in leadership in protecting citizens against 
predatory lending in the absence of effective state and federal 
action.163 Moreover, because public opinion favoring limits on small-
loan pricing has proven more durable than the limits themselves, 
local leaders face significant constituent pressure to respond to 
payday and car-title lending.164 In the past few years, at least 135 
local governments have attempted to restrict, regulate, or otherwise 
arrest the development of usurious lending within their 
boundaries.165 Local governments with starkly different political 
and demographic profiles have reached similar conclusions 
regarding the need to inhibit predatory small loans within their 
neighborhoods.166 For example, San Francisco, one of the nation’s 
most liberal cities, has adopted a fringe lending ordinance very 
similar in approach to those found in small, conservative towns like 
Little Elm, Texas and American Fork, Utah.167 Even still, this 
                                                                                                     
 162. See id. (arguing for a rate limit); see also supra note 158 and 
accompanying text (explaining Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory). 
 163. See Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 2, 14 (concluding that 
many states do not pass laws to protect consumers from usurious payday 
lending, so “[l]ocal governments are left to address the problem of payday 
lenders on their own”). 
 164. See id. (discussing local leaders’ reactions to public opinion against 
predatory loans). 
 165. Id. at 15–20. 
 166. See id. (listing many different cities with similar limits). 
 167. Id. at 16, 18 (listing payday-lender ordinances of several localities, 
including American Fork, Utah); Pallavi Gogoi, Costly Cash: In Texas, Towns Try 
Zoning Out Payday Lenders, DAILY FIN. (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/03/10/costly-cash-in-texas-towns-try-zoning-
out-payday-lenders (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (identifying Texas municipalities, 
including Little Elm, that have “wage[d] war against money stores”) (on file with the 
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significant ground-swell of local support for restrictions on 
predatory small loans likely understates the actual support for 
regulation because the limits on local government power probably 
deter some governments from acting.168 
Local leaders hoping to inhibit predatory lending within their 
communities must contend with federal and state preemption of 
their ordinances. Federal preemption controls local ordinances just 
as it does state legislatures.169 So, for instance, local governments 
lack the power to cap interest rates charged by banks and credit 
unions under the Supreme Court’s Marquette doctrine and its 
related legislative buttressing.170 Moreover, statutes adopted by 
state legislatures can, in some contexts, also preempt local 
ordinances.171  
Nevertheless, local governments do retain some powers 
traditionally reserved for local governments.172 Some local leaders 
have aggressively pushed the outer boundaries of these powers by 
attempting to eliminate predatory small loans within their cities or 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review); 7 on Your Side: New Rules for Payday Lenders, 
(ABC7 KGO-TV San Francisco Television Broadcast Dec. 26, 2007), 
available at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/7_on_your_side&id=585
6908 (discussing the San Francisco ordinance that “no new payday lenders will be 
allowed to set up shop within a quarter of a mile of an existing one”). 
 168. See, e.g., Rudolph Bush, Dallas Council Urged to Limit Payday Lending 
Sites, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/ 
community-news/dallas/headlines/20110103-dallas-council-urged-to-limit-payday-
lending-sites.ece (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (“Council member Tennell Atkins, 
who[se]  . . . district is home to dozens of payday-lending stores, said he’s ‘125 
percent against them.’ But a resolution to the Legislature may be an empty 
gesture. . . . The industry’s powerful lobbying arm has spread hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to elected officials in Austin.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 169. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 170. See supra notes 27–37 and accompanying text (summarizing Marquette 
and its aftermath). 
 171. See infra Part V.B. (discussing the law of state preemption of local 
ordinances). 
 172. See, e.g., infra note 250 and accompanying text (stating that courts 
typically allow local governments to regulate consumer finance). 
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counties. For example, Jacksonville, Florida adopted an ordinance 
attempting to cap payday loan prices.173 Florida state law generally 
imposes a usury limit of 18%.174 Lenders exceeding this price cap 
without a license are subject to criminal prosecution.175 But, the 
Florida legislature has also granted licenses to payday lenders 
allowing them to charge fees amounting to an interest rate of 
approximately 300% on a typical payday loan.176 Many Florida 
payday lenders ignore this high limit by purporting to partner with 
a broker, called a credit service organization, that charges a fee for 
arranging the payday loan.177 In effect, many payday lenders 
entirely ignore Florida’s triple-digit interest rate price cap through 
this loophole. 
Resentful of the consequences of these loans for its citizens, 
particularly the many military service members stationed at a local 
navy base, Jacksonville attempted to push for a more consumer-
friendly usury law by adopting its own 36% interest rate limit.178 
The city took the position that the state’s price cap on payday 
lending constituted a consumer protection floor that the city could 
raise if it chose to do so.179 Nothing in the state’s payday lending 
statute explicitly contradicted this interpretation.180 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 30–36 (providing the 
Jacksonville ordinance regulating payday-lending practices). 
 174. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.02(1), 687.03(1) (2011). 
 175. Id. Unlicensed lending—even in large amounts—at annual interest 
rates above 25% is a crime in the state of Florida. Id. § 687.071. 
 176. See id. § 560.404(6) (allowing payday lenders to charge up to 10% of the 
loan plus a verification fee); Peterson, supra note 7, at 1123–24 (explaining how 
a fee of $52 can amount to a triple-digit interest rate on the payday loan). 
 177. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1152–53 (explaining how payday lenders 
partner with credit service organizations “to make payday loans outside the 
scope of state price limits” (citations omitted)). 
 178. See Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 26, 30–36 (providing 
the 2005 Jacksonville ordinance, which “reduc[ed] the interest rate to 36%” 
because “payday lending practices in general have proven to be detrimental to 
numerous individuals[,] including military service members”). 
 179. See id. at 31–32 (“This [statute] is supplemental to all other laws or 
ordinances, and in no way impairs or restricts the authority granted to the 
Florida Department of Financial Services, or any other regulatory authority 
with concurrent jurisdiction over the matters stated in this chapter.”). 
 180. See Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Fla., Inc. v. Consol. City of 
Jacksonville, Fla., No. 16-2005-CA-7025-MA, slip op. at 2–3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 
1, 2006) (stating that the state payday lending statute does not explicitly define 
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when a payday lender challenged the city’s ordinance, a state trial 
judge struck down the price cap, finding that the state legislature 
had intended to preempt local price regulation.181  
Less direct than Jacksonville’s ordinance, a St. Ann, Missouri 
ordinance attempted to prevent triple-digit payday lending within 
its city by framing its prohibition as an exercise of municipalities’ 
traditional right to use zoning law for land-use planning.182 The 
Missouri legislature adopted a statute that authorizes licensed 
payday lenders to collect interest and fees up to 75% of the initial 
principle of any single loan.183 While there is some ambiguity in the 
statute, the law’s most simple interpretation appears to authorize 
accrued interest of 75% of the loan principle, which, for a typical 
two-week payday loan of $325, constitutes an astounding annual 
interest rate of 1955.36%.184 Concerned about the stability and 
propriety of this type of lending, St. Ann acted to protect its citizens 
with an ordinance that read:  
A business engaged in providing short-term loans to members of 
the public as a primary or substantial element of its operations 
and which is not licensed by the appropriate state or federal 
agency as a bank or savings and loan association[] . . . is 
prohibited in all zoning districts of the City of St. Ann. 185 
While the ordinance did not presume to cap interest rates—
something that would have clearly contradicted Missouri’s 
                                                                                                     
the elements of the payday-lending relationship). 
 181. See id. at 2. 
 182. See State ex rel. Sunshine Enters. of Mo. v. Bd. of Adjustment of St. 
Ann, 64 S.W.3d 310, 311–13 (Mo. 2002) (stating that St. Ann viewed its 
ordinance prohibiting payday lenders as “a land use ‘zoning’ regulation,” which 
would be “presumptively within the police power” (citations omitted)); see also 
Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 27 (describing the St. Ann 
ordinance). 
 183. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 408.100, 408.505.3 (2011). 
 184. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1139 (“A $325 loan that grows 75% in 14 
days carries an annual percentage rate of 1955.36%.”); APR Calculation 
Formula, MO. DIVISION OF FIN., http://finance.mo.gov/consumercredit/apr.php 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (showing how a 75% interest rate can yield an 
enormous annual interest rate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 185. Sunshine Enters., 64 S.W.3d at 312 (providing the St. Ann, Missouri 
ordinance that the court overrules) (citation omitted). 
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extremely high price limit on payday loans—it did refuse to grant a 
local business license to any non-depository short-term lender.186 A 
payday lender brought suit challenging the ordinance, and the case 
eventually made its way to the Missouri Supreme Court.187 The 
court held that, although the ordinance purported to be a zoning 
measure, state law nonetheless preempted it because St. Ann had 
prohibited an activity that state law permits.188 
So limited, some local governments have attempted to use the 
persuasive power of their moral authority, rather than the operation 
of law, to prevent predatory small loans. For example, some cities 
and counties have adopted non-binding resolutions demanding that 
their state legislatures re-establish traditional usury limits.189 Local 
governments in Virginia, where legislative battles on payday and 
car-title lending have become a seasonal fixture, have pursued this 
strategy in particular.190 Over thirty different local governments 
have adopted non-binding resolutions demanding that Virginia re-
establish a traditional usury limit of 36%.191 But, as this Article goes 
to press, a majority of the Virginia Assembly remains unpersuaded. 
While Jacksonville and St. Ann serve as examples of ordinances 
that did not survive judicial challenges, there are many more local 
governments that have taken measures that remain in force. In 
recent years, local governments have turned to their well-accepted 
power to adopt zoning ordinances to stem the tide of payday and 
car-title lending within their jurisdictions. These zoning ordinances 
                                                                                                     
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. at 310. 
 188. See id. at 314 (“Where the city prohibits a business that state law 
permits, the city has the burden to show that the ordinance does not conflict 
with state law. . . . In this case, the city has not shown that Ordinance 2074 is a 
valid exercise of the zoning power.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Resolution No. 3202, § 1, Sachse, Texas (April 5, 2010) (urging 
the state legislature and Governor of Texas to enact laws to “[c]lose the loophole 
in state law that allows payday, auto title, and other consumer loans to carry 
annual percentage rates upwards of 500%.”). 
 190. See Anita Kumar, Pressure Mounts on Va. Payday Lenders: Coalition 
Plans to Push Legislature for Limits, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2007, at B01 (“More 
than [thirty] Virginia cities and counties have approved resolutions seeking 
stricter regulations.”). 
 191. See Griffith, Hilton & Drysdale, supra note 16, at 20 (“During 2007 and 
2008 at least 37 cities in Virginia passed a resolution asking the state assembly 
to cap payday loan interest rates.”). 
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tend to take one or more of three basic forms: (1) restrictions on the 
location where predatory lenders can operate; (2) discretional 
permits that restrict who may obtain licenses to engage in predatory 
lending; and (3) permanent or temporary limits on the number of 
predatory lending locations within a jurisdiction.  
First, perhaps the most common local restriction on predatory 
lending outlets is a limit on where lenders can locate. Some 
jurisdictions restrict the proximity of predatory lenders to 
residences, churches, schools, or other protected buildings. For 
example, Oakland, California prohibits the location of check 
cashiers within 500 feet of any school.192 Some local governments 
also restrict predatory lenders from clustering together by requiring 
a minimum distance separating locations.193 There is considerable 
variety in the required minimum distance, with some leaders 
adopting a cosmetic 600 feet and others requiring as much as a mile 
of separation.194 Other local leaders have protected specially zoned 
commercial districts or streets where predatory lenders are not 
allowed. For example, Sachse, Texas prohibits payday lenders, 
check cashers, and car-title lenders from locating within 500 feet of 
the President George Bush Tollway.195  
Second, many local governments have adopted ordinances that 
require a special permit prior to opening a predatory lending 
location.196 These conditional permits typically require an 
application and a public hearing in front of some type of land-use 
planning board.197 These hearings give local governments an 
                                                                                                     
 192. OAKLAND, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 17.102.430(A)(2) (2004) (restricting 
check-cashing activities from operating near certain protected facilities). 
 193. See, e.g., CASA GRANDE, ARIZ., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.12.415(A) 
(2009) (requiring a minimum distance of 1,320 feet separating deferred 
presentment companies). 
 194. Compare WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH, CODE § 7-1-103(30) (2011) (“No 
check cashing or deferred deposit loan business shall be located within 600 feet 
of any other check cashing business.”), with SANDY CITY, UTAH, LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CODE, § 15A-11-20(A)(1) (2008) (stating that non-depositary 
financial institutions “[s]hall not be located within 5,280 feet (one mile) of the 
same type of use inside or outside the Sandy City geographical boundaries”). 
 195. SACHSE, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. 3, § 11.2(c)(1) (2009). 
 196. See, e.g., ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. X, 
§ 1003.133(3)(21) (2009) (requiring small-loan businesses to obtain a permit 
before locating in certain areas). 
 197. See, e.g., id. § 1003.181(8) (describing procedures for obtaining the 
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opportunity to look into the background of the permit applicant and 
consider the merits of the proposed location. While there is variation 
in local practices, the ordinances that create these conditional 
permit requirements tend not to impose overly restrictive standards 
on who can receive a permit. In practice, these permit requirements 
create a small barrier to entry but typically do not empower 
planning boards to effectively eliminate predatory small-loan outlets 
in their communities.198  
Third, some jurisdictions have explicitly limited the number of 
predatory small-loan locations that may exist within their 
communities. For example, the leaders of St. Ann, Missouri, who 
unsuccessfully attempted to prohibit all payday lenders in their 
town, have since limited payday lenders to no more than three 
locations.199 Some cities and counties have adopted limits relative to 
the population. For example, West Valley City, Utah has an 
ordinance limiting payday lenders to no more than one store per ten 
thousand residents.200 Still, other governments have adopted 
temporary moratoriums prohibiting new locations while the 
government leaders study and debate how to respond to predatory 
lending.201  
Unfortunately, each of these zoning strategies suffers from 
systemic weakness. Almost without exception, zoning restrictions 
                                                                                                     
conditional-use permit, including an application and a hearing). 
 198. If the permits are overly restrictive in a state that permits such 
establishments, courts would likely strike down the ordinance as prohibitive 
and contrary to state law. See State ex rel. Sunshine Enters. of Mo. v. Bd. of 
Adjustment of St. Ann, 64 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Mo. 2002) (holding invalid a city 
ordinance that effectively prohibited businesses otherwise permitted under 
Missouri law). 
 199. See ST. ANN, MO., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. IV, ch. 400, § 390(23) (2011) 
(limiting the number of short-term loan establishments in the C-2 district to 
three). The C-2 district is the only district in St. Ann that allows short-term loan 
establishments; all other districts that allow businesses specifically exclude 
these establishments or include only other, enumerated businesses. Id. §§ 20, 
290(H), 460(12), 550–70. 
 200. See WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH, CODE § 7-1-103(30) (2011) (allowing one 
deferred-deposit loan business per ten thousand citizens living in West Valley 
City). 
 201. See, e.g., Ruth Ingram, Business Ban Still in Effect in Clinton, CLARION-
LEDGER, Mar. 15, 2010, at A9 (discussing Clinton, Mississippi’s moratorium on 
new payday loan stores). 
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have provided too little protection too late. Local governments 
established limits on the number of locations after the predatory 
lenders already saturated the city, town, or county with outlets.202 
Indeed, this saturation has typically served as the political impetus 
for the ordinance in the first place.203 Most local governments have 
felt compelled to grandfather-in existing locations, which effectively 
cements the unsatisfactory development pattern in place for the 
long term.204 Moreover, minimum-distance restrictions on predatory 
lender locations may look good on paper but actually provide 
minimal inhibition of the lenders’ business models. Payday lenders 
themselves report in their SEC disclosures that they generally 
attempt to locate within three miles of their target demographic.205 
Virtually all the distance limits adopted throughout the United 
States are too small to impede the basic business model of predatory 
small-loan businesses. Zoning barriers to entry may, in effect, 
actually serve only to inhibit whatever minimal competition exists 
within the predatory lending market. Although excluding payday or 
car-title lenders from some favored districts may be cosmetically 
appealing, it does little to protect vulnerable citizens from financial 
predators. Ironically, many of the zoning restrictions only serve to 
“force” predatory lenders to locate in the poor, often minority 
                                                                                                     
 202. See, e.g., id. (providing an example of how fifteen “shops classified as 
either pawn, loan or title loan, payday loan, check-cashing, or check or cash 
advance” remained unaffected by the city’s moratorium). 
 203. See, e.g., Tim Jones, States to Payday Lenders: Denied: Governments 
Curb Loan Operators That Have Grown So Much They Outnumber McDonald’s 
Outlets, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 23, 2008, at 3 (discussing how the “explosive” 
growth of payday lenders has led some state legislatures to debate rate caps and 
other reforms). 
 204. See, e.g., NORWALK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 17.04, art. II, § 95(D) 
(2012) (“Any payday loan establishment lawfully existing prior to the effective 
date of the ordinance codified in this section and which is licensed by the City of 
Norwalk[] shall be allowed to remain on the same property . . . .”). 
 205. See, e.g., Check Into Cash, Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement Under 
the Securities Act of 1933, SEC ARCHIVES, 33 (July 31, 1998), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067289/0000931763-98-001978.txt (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Check Into Cash] (stating that Check Into 
Cash “seeks to open each new store within three miles of the market area that it 
is intended to serve”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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neighborhoods and strip malls that they wanted to operate in 
anyway.206 
But perhaps the most unsatisfactory result of local ordinances 
is their propensity to demobilize efforts for more meaningful change. 
Zoning ordinances have been relatively easy to pass precisely 
because predatory lenders do not view these rules as a threat to 
their activities.207 In reality, while zoning ordinances do very little to 
protect vulnerable families from abusive financial products, they do 
provide political cover for leaders who do not want to risk offending 
the powerful predatory finance lobby.208 Well-intentioned local 
governments can declare a “victory,” congratulate themselves with 
an article in the local newspaper, and leave the basic underlying 
problem unsolved. There is little indication that these zoning 
ordinances have been part of effective campaigns building toward 
more lasting and meaningful legal changes.209  
V. Plainspoken Leadership: A Proposal for Cautionary Signage 
Ordinances 
This Part proposes a local ordinance strategy through which 
local leaders could both provide meaningful consumer protection 
and send a strong message mobilizing their community toward 
traditional limits on predatory loans. Appendix A, which follows this 
Article, includes a “Model Small Predatory Lending Ordinance.” 
This ordinance proposes that local governments require a 
                                                                                                     
 206. See James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in 
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 30, 31, 35 
(Fannie Mae Found. 2001) (presenting data that the subprime lending market 
concentrates in low-income, minority neighborhoods and that lenders target 
limited-income households). 
 207. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 7, at 1157 (“The counterintuitive irony is 
that high cost lenders actually advocated for the very exceptions and loopholes 
that have raised the compliance costs associated with nonuniform state 
policymaking.” (citation omitted)). 
 208. See, e.g., id. at 1111 & n.2 (stating that the payday-lending industry 
spends millions on lobbying and public relations). 
 209. It is worth noting that the proposed model ordinance included in 
Appendix A is not mutually exclusive with other existing local ordinances. Local 
governments that have already adopted zoning restrictions should also consider 
adapting the proposed model ordinance to fit within their existing laws.  
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cautionary message on signs at businesses offering credit at annual 
percentage rates exceeding 45%.210 The signage requirements of the 
proposed small predatory lending ordinance are divided into two 
different types. 
First, the ordinance requires that all of the exterior signs at a 
predatory lending business carry a local government cautionary 
message.211 For example, an ordinance adopted by the city of 
“Anywhere” would read: “City of Anywhere Warning: Predatory 
Lender.” The ordinance requires that the display of this cautionary 
message covers one-third of the spatial area on each exterior sign212 
and that the text of the cautionary message be black on a white 
background.213 While the proposed ordinance requires that 
predatory lenders display the warning on any of their exterior signs, 
the warning is not required if the lender forgoes exterior signage.214 
Thus, the warning requirement is “tailored to match the degree to 
which a predatory lender advertises at its location. The amount of 
required warning signage matches the amount of predatory lending 
advertisement chosen by the predatory lender.”215 
Second, the ordinance requires the display of official door signs 
created and distributed by the director of a city or county 
department who is charged with enforcing the ordinance.216 The 
ordinance requires display of these door signs on all exterior doors of 
a predatory lending facility.217 These official door signs include the 
cautionary message in the same color and font pattern as the 
warnings displayed on the lender’s existing exterior signs.218 But, 
the cautionary door sign also includes an additional explanation 
indicating: that the city or county in question has determined that 
the facility displaying the sign engages in predatory lending; that 
the local government requires predatory lending warnings on 
                                                                                                     
 210. Infra Appendix A § 600. 
 211. Infra Appendix A § 600(b). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. § 600 official cmt. 2. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Infra Appendix A § 600(c), (d). 
 217. Infra Appendix A § 600(c). 
 218. See infra Appendix A § 600(e) (“[P]redatory lending door signs shall 
have black, Arial, all-capitals text with a white background.”). 
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displayed signs under a consumer protection law; that the lender 
offers loans at interest rates above 45%; and, that “[t]hese loans can 
cause bounced checks, penalty fees, repossessions, lawsuits, and 
severe financial hardship.”219 
In addition to signage requirements, the proposed ordinance 
includes a few other features designed to defend and enforce the 
ordinance. With respect to the former, predatory lenders are likely 
to challenge this ordinance in court. To this end, the proposed 
ordinance includes legislative findings based upon empirical 
research regarding the consequences of predatory lending.220 The 
model ordinance also includes official comments that explain the 
various provisions of the statute, including graphic illustrations of 
the ordinances’ signage requirements.221 With respect to 
enforcement, the model ordinance requires all businesses lending at 
annual percentage rates (APR) in excess of 45% to obtain a 
permit.222 The permit requirement includes a licensing fee to cover 
the cost of enforcement of the ordinance and to generate revenue for 
the city or county.223 The proposed ordinance allows either the local 
government agency charged with enforcing the act or former 
borrowers to bring lawsuits to enforce the ordinance.224 Similar to 
federal consumer-protection laws, the ordinance instructs courts to 
award modest statutory damages, court costs, and reasonable 
attorney fees to the local government or private plaintiffs that 
succeed in an enforcement lawsuit.225 
There is no question that predatory lenders will be incensed by 
the proposed predatory small loan ordinance suggested in this 
Article. But their visceral reaction is born from the painful reality of 
their commercial behavior. The truth of what these businesses have 
become is hurtful. Despite their public relations and government 
                                                                                                     
 219. Id. 
 220. See infra Appendix A § 200 (providing findings about the predatory 
practices of high-cost loans). 
 221. See, e.g., infra Appendix A § 600 official cmt. 3 (providing illustrations 
of signs). 
 222. Infra Appendix A §§ 500(a), 300(e). 
 223. See infra Appendix A § 500(b) (imposing an annual fee of approximately 
$10,000). 
 224. Infra Appendix A § 700(b), (c). 
 225. Id. 
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lobbying efforts to the contrary, lenders that charge exorbitant 
interest rates to American families are false friends of the working 
poor and middle classes. While these lucrative companies have, in 
many instances, invested their profits in forging their polished 
corporate brands, local government leaders are under no obligation 
to play along with efforts to camouflage abusive loans. Indeed, as 
President Reagan once explained, “To grasp and hold a vision, to fix 
it in your senses—that is the very essence, I believe, of successful 
leadership . . . .”226 The proposed ordinance in Appendix A is useful 
because it provides a reoccurring, simple, and boldly featured 
message of warning to potential victims of abusive commercial 
behavior. Instead of confusing, numeric information that many 
Americans cannot understand,227 the proposed ordinance clearly 
signals the danger associated with predatory loans. High-cost 
lenders will object to this warning not because it is inaccurate but 
because they realize its power and effectiveness. 
A. Why Forty-Five Percent? Choosing a Clear, Justified, and 
Enforceable Bright Line 
The proposed model ordinance includes a clear and enforceable 
bright-line price threshold of 45% APR for identifying predatory 
small loans. This is an appropriate threshold for at least two 
reasons. First, the characterization of loans at prices above 45% 
APR as “predatory” reflects the policy objectives of federal law. 
Under current federal criminal law, an annual actuarial interest 
rate in excess of 45% is considered one factor in establishing prima 
facie evidence that a loan is extortionate.228 Extortionate 
lending is a serious crime, punishable by up to twenty years in 
                                                                                                     
 226. Ronald Reagan, President, Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted by Artists 
and Cultural Leaders in Moscow (May 31, 1988), available at 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/053188a.htm.  
 227. See Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and 
Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit 
Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 876–79, 920 (1977) (providing data that only a 
small percentage of study participants could understand how to calculate the 
full cost of credit). 
 228. 18 U.S.C. § 892(b)(2) (2006). 
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federal prison.229 While there are, of course, additional elements 
factored into the criminal prosecution of extortionate lending, the 
prima facie evidentiary threshold of 45% reflects the congressional 
judgment that prices above this interest rate are indicative of 
criminal, and by implication predatory, behavior.230 In common 
usage, the term “predatory” merely indicates that a behavior is 
inclined to injure or exploit for personal gain or profit.231 For over 
forty years, federal law has held that loan prices in excess of 45% 
are indicative of illicit and exploitative intentions.232 Because 
Congress has used this threshold as a legal device suitable, in part, 
for determining when high-cost lenders should be incarcerated, it is 
also appropriate as a threshold in warning potential victims of the 
likelihood of this potentially criminal and predatory behavior. 
Second, while the 45% evidentiary threshold in federal law does 
not, by itself, establish a criminal limit, many other federal and 
state laws, both today and in the past, use an interest rate limit as 
the conclusive standard of illegal and, in many states, criminal 
behavior. For example, federal law establishes a 36% APR usury 
limit on loans made to military service members and their 
                                                                                                     
 229. Id. § 892(a). 
 230. The conference report on the Consumer Credit Protection Act justifies 
the 45% evidentiary threshold thus: 
Section 892 is in no sense a Federal usury law. The charging of a rate 
in excess of 45 percent per annum is merely one of a set of factors 
which, where there is inadequate evidence to explain them, are 
deemed sufficiently indicative of the existence of criminal means of 
collection to justify a statutory inference that such means were, in 
fact, contemplated by the parties. 
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1397, at 30 (1968) (Conf. Rep.). 
 231. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 977 (11th ed. 2011). 
 232. See Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 202, 
82 Stat. 146, 159–61 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 892(b)(2) (2006)) 
(stating that an annual actuarial interest rate above 45% is a factor in 
establishing prima facie evidence of extortionate credit); see also Edward L. 
Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons From the Truth-in-Lending Act, 
80 GEO. L.J. 233, 261 (1991) (discussing the House’s 1968 passage of an 
amendment to the Truth and Lending Act that labeled “loan sharking” a federal 
offense); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High Cost 
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. 
REV. 808, 879–80 (2003) (discussing the addition of extortionate credit 
provisions to the Truth and Lending Act). 
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dependents.233 In the recent past, all fifty states had usury limits on 
small consumer loans, typically at a price threshold much lower 
than the 45% threshold in this Article’s proposed ordinance.234 
Currently, New York City, the nucleus of American finance, 
continues to do business without pause under the shadow of a 
strictly enforced criminal interest rate limit of 25%.235 Georgia 
punishes violations of its usury limit with up to a year in prison.236 
Similarly, in Florida, the label “loan shark” is a legal term of art 
defined by statute.237 Unlicensed lenders in Florida are guilty of 
misdemeanor “loan sharking” when they willfully lend at annual 
interest rates in excess of 25%.238 Unlicensed lending at interest 
rates of above 45% is punishable as a third-degree felony.239 If in all 
these jurisdictions, the government can sue and even imprison 
lenders for victimizing borrowers with abusive pricing, surely it is 
also appropriate, indeed commendable, to at least provide an 
                                                                                                     
 233. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 
10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2006). 
 234. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1160–61 (outlining the “usury-limited 
credit market” of the 1950s and 1960s). 
 235. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2011).  
 236. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-2(d) (2011). 
 237. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(1)(f) (West 2011) (“‘Loan shark’ means any 
person as defined herein who lends money unlawfully under subsection (2), [or] 
subsection (3) . . . .”). 
 238. Id. § 687.071(2). This subsection provides: 
Unless otherwise specifically allowed by law, any person making an 
extension of credit to any person, who shall willfully and knowingly 
charge, take, or receive interest thereon at a rate exceeding 25 
percent per annum but not in excess of 45 percent per annum, or the 
equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period of time, whether directly 
or indirectly, or conspires so to do, commits a misdemeanor of the 
second degree . . . . 
Id. 
 239. Id. § 687.071(3). This subsection provides: 
Unless otherwise specifically allowed by law, any person making an 
extension of credit to any person, who shall willfully and knowingly 
charge, take, or receive interest thereon at a rate exceeding 45 
percent per annum or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter 
period of time, whether directly or indirectly, or conspires so to do, 
commits a felony of the third degree . . . . 
Id. 
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effective and prominent warning to borrowers who do not enjoy the 
benefit of comparable protections. 
Given the tradition and current laws of many states that 
outlaw loans at interest rates higher than 45%, some local 
government leaders will view this threshold as set too high. 
Arguably, it would be more appropriate to set the threshold limit at 
36% to mirror the most common American small-loan limit 
throughout the twentieth century,240 as well as the federal cap on 
loans to military service members.241 Moreover, there are many 
financial practices that are fairly characterized as predatory 
independent of a 45% interest rate threshold.242 For example, other 
abusive payday loan features and practices include: making loans 
without considering borrowers’ ability to repay; imposing balloon 
payments that force repeated refinancing; using checks or 
automated clearing house debit authorizations to coerce repayment; 
imposing pyramiding or otherwise excessive late fees; and charging 
excessive attorneys’ fees in the collection of small debts—all of 
which are independent of the loan’s basically excessive price. 
Similarly, in the mortgage lending market, many subprime and 
exotic mortgage loans were predatory, not because of their interest 
rate, but because they targeted the value of the family’s home or 
relied on flawed underwriting.243 Nevertheless, while not every 
predatory loan has an interest rate of 45%, many local government 
leaders may reasonably conclude that every loan with an interest 
rate of 45% is predatory. 
Questions are likely to be raised regarding whether a variety of 
consumer loans fall within the scope of the proposed model 
ordinance. For example, tax-refund-anticipation loans, unsecured 
finance company loans, and pawnshop loans can sometimes carry 
                                                                                                     
 240. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 1142–43, 1161 (discussing a median 
usury limit of 36% APR in 1965). 
 241. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 
10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2006). 
 242. See, e.g., ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT. CONSUMER LAW CTR., STOP 
PREDATORY LENDING: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES 28–32 (2002) (listing types 
of lenders). 
 243. See, e.g., Patricia Sturdevant & William J. Brennan, Jr., A Catalogue of 
Predatory Lending Practices, 5 CONSUMER ADVOC. 4 (1999) (listing practices); 
Carr & Kolluri, supra note 206, at 32–35 (discussing fraudulent lending 
behavior). 
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interest rates in excess of 45%. Importantly, lenders can offer all of 
these forms of credit at more modest prices when combined with 
responsible underwriting and reputable collection methods. But, 
insofar as the federal Truth in Lending Act characterizes these 
forms of credit as carrying an APR exceeding 45%, the model 
ordinance as written will require the same signage warnings that 
will almost certainly be imposed on typical payday and car-title 
lending companies. Some lenders and merchants are likely to 
demand special exceptions under a proposed ordinance. However, 
making an exception for one type of merchant, practice, loan term, 
or another will open the door to claims of an unlevel playing field. It 
will ultimately erode the clear, bright line that is one of the primary 
advantages of the ordinance. By hinging the ordinance on federal 
law, local governments would harness a pre-existing body of law 
that has already had many years of thoughtful interpretation by 
regulators and courts. In contrast, as language attempting to grant 
exceptions is introduced into the model ordinance, the likelihood of 
predatory lenders developing strategies to exploit loopholes will 
increase. A 45% APR trigger will provide a high, yet clear, bright 
line with low compliance costs for businesses and simple 
enforcement for both courts and local governments. 
B. A Predatory Lender Warning Signage Ordinance Is Not 
Preempted by State Law 
There is considerable variation in the powers granted to local 
governments to regulate commercial activity. Unlike sovereign state 
governments, courts regard local governments as administrative 
subdivisions of their states that do not have “inherent” powers.244 
Some local governments have “home-rule” authority, generally 
thought to include all powers not expressly denied by state 
statute.245 Other jurisdictions, in contrast, follow “Dillon’s rule,” 
                                                                                                     
 244. 2 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 13:1 (2008). 
 245. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 135, 138–39 (Mich. 
1994) (“[I]t is clear that home rule cities enjoy not only those powers specifically 
granted, but they may also exercise all powers not expressly denied.”). 
Nevertheless, “courts differ as to the nature of home-rule powers.” MARTINEZ, 
supra note 244, § 13:3 (citations omitted). For further description of the law of 
home rule, see generally DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL JR., 
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which holds that local governments have only those powers “granted 
in express words” together with those powers necessarily implied or 
essentially granted by statute.246 Even under this more restrictive 
approach, most states have expressly granted local governments the 
broad authority to enact any laws or regulations that are 
“reasonably related” to the promotion of “health, safety, morals, 
peace, or general welfare.”247 Nevertheless, local governments “may 
not enact . . . ordinances which are inconsistent with state law or 
which infringe the spirit of state law.”248 Generally speaking, “[a] 
state statute preempts municipal ordinances when either the 
language in the ordinance contradicts the language in the statute or 
when [the judiciary finds that] the [l]egislature has intended to 
thoroughly occupy the field [of regulation].”249  
Courts have consistently held that, in the absence of express or 
field preemption, local authority to regulate for the general welfare 
includes authority to regulate consumer finance.250 Most directly, in 
the past, some courts recognized the authority of local governments 
to directly cap interest rates on consumer loans.251 Looking beyond 
the issue of price, courts have upheld local government authority to 
issue a wide variety of consumer-financial-services regulations. For 
example, courts have generally upheld permit requirements for 
                                                                                                     
HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK (2001). 
 246. Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868) (Dillon, C.J.), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A (1968), as 
recognized in City of Asbury v. Iowa City Dev. Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188 (Iowa 2006); 
JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 
(Chicago, James Cockcroft & Co. 1872). The rule is named after John F. Dillon, 
an Iowa Supreme Court Justice and Columbia Law Professor. For a more 
detailed discussion of jurisprudence in Dillon’s rule jurisdictions, see MARTINEZ, 
supra note 244, §§ 13:4–13:9. For a critical analysis of Dillon’s rule and home 
rule, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–11 (1990). 
 247. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 369 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 248. MARTINEZ, supra note 244, § 13:6; 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal 
Corporations § 315 (2010). 
 249. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations § 316 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 250. See 7 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24:334 (3d ed. 
2005) (“[A] municipality can regulate usury under a general welfare 
clause.”(citation omitted)). 
 251. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Phillips, 85 S.E. 963, 963–64 (S.C. 1915) 
(upholding Columbia’s 8% simple nominal annual interest rate limit). 
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pawnshops or other types of small consumer finance lenders.252 
Permit requirements are usually upheld even when the permit is 
duplicative of a state license.253 And in some states, the 
enforceability of contracts may be challenged where the lender 
failed to obtain a local permit.254 By way of example, the Ohio 
Supreme Court upheld the right of a local government to require 
that small lenders record details on every loan made and file weekly 
reports to a city auditor.255 The Missouri Supreme Court held that 
local governments had the power to require that pawnbrokers take 
and maintain a photograph of every customer pawning 
merchandise.256 Moreover, courts have generally upheld local 
ordinances that impose per-transaction fees on consumer lenders.257 
Local law regarding consumer financial services can be enforced 
through criminal sanctions, even when those sanctions are 
complementary or duplicative of state statutes.258  
                                                                                                     
 252. See, e.g., Iscoff v. Police Comm’n of San Francisco, 222 Cal. App. 2d 395, 
401–05 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (pawnshop permit); Medias v. City of Indianapolis, 
23 N.E.2d 590, 594 (Ind. 1939) (pawnbroker license); City of Rochester v. Bemel, 
233 N.W. 862, 863 (Minn. 1930) (junk-dealer license); Provident Loan Soc’y v. 
City & County of Denver, 172 P. 10, 12 (Colo. 1918) (pawnbroker license); City 
of Seattle v. Barto 71 P. 735, 736 (Wash. 1903) (pawnbroker license); see also 
7 MCQUILLIN, supra note 250, § 26:154.3 (collecting and analyzing cases 
upholding license requirements for pawnbrokers). 
 253. See, e.g., Malish v. City of San Diego, 84 Cal. App. 4th 725, 736 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he Legislature has expressly authorized duplicative 
ordinances regulating pawnbrokers by allowing the enactment and enforcement 
of ordinances that are not inconsistent with state law.”); City of New Orleans v. 
Heymann, 162 So. 582, 584 (La. 1935) (upholding the city’s license tax on small-
loan lenders). 
 254. See generally Annotation, Failure of Moneylender or Creditor Engaged 
in Business of Making Loans to Procure License or Permit as Affecting Validity 
or Enforceability of Contract, 29 A.L.R. 4th 884, 884–896 (1984) (discussing the 
enforceability of a lender’s contracts when the lender fails to obtain a permit). 
 255. Sanning v. City of Cincinnati, 90 N.E. 125, 127, 129 (1909). 
 256. Liberman v. Cervantes, 511 S.W.2d 835, 837–38 (Mo. 1974); see also 
Pawnmart, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cnty., 608 S.E.2d 639 (Ga. 2005) (upholding a local 
ordinance requiring pawnbrokers to obtain fingerprints and digital photographs 
of customers). 
 257. See, e.g., USA Cash # 1, Inc. v. City of Saginaw, 776 N.W.2d 346, 357 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that locally imposed, per-transaction fees imposed 
on pawnbrokers “do not conflict with state law regulating the same area merely 
because the state law imposes no fees”). 
 258. See, e.g., City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 473 P.2d 917, 920 (N.M. Ct. App. 
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Moreover, courts have traditionally regarded ordinances 
regulating signs as particularly within the authority of local 
governments.259 For well over a hundred years, local governments 
have been regulating merchants’ outdoor advertising.260 While 
authority to regulate signs is not unlimited, from early on, courts 
have deferred to local signage ordinances. For example, Chicago 
won multiple litigation battles with billboard advertisers in the 
early twentieth century.261 Today, there is extensive jurisprudence 
granting local governments the power to regulate outdoor signs in 
virtually every state in the republic.262 Sign ordinances of many 
different types and purposes are routinely upheld, including limits 
on their location, construction, maintenance, size, and use.263 A 
leading treatise explains that signage ordinances “are to be 
sustained upon the basis of promotion of the public safety, 
convenience, comfort, morals, and welfare of the inhabitants; more 
specifically, they constitute a legitimate exercise of the police 
power. . . .”264 While the laws of each state are different, a New York 
court explained that municipalities traditionally have “wide 
latitude” to adopt ordinances concerning outdoor signs which 
“presumptively are valid.”265 
                                                                                                     
1970) (“With the enactment of [a state regulation], there is regulation of 
pawnbrokers by both the State and the municipality. The fact of double 
regulation does not result in the withdrawal of the municipality’s authority to 
regulate. An ordinance may duplicate or complement statutory regulations.”). 
 259. See Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 606 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (Ill. 1992) 
(finding that “municipalities have traditionally regulated outdoor advertising 
signs through the enforcement of local ordinances”). 
 260. See Roger A. Cunningham, Billboard Control Under the Highway 
Beautification Act of 1965, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1346–47 (1973) (“[C]ases 
[from the early 1900s] may be found upholding the validity of municipal 
billboard regulation . . . .”). 
 261. See, e.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 108 N.E. 340, 347 (Ill. 
1914), aff’d, 242 U.S. 526 (1917) (“[F]ull power and authority are conferred upon 
cities, towns, and villages to regulate the construction and use of billboards 
within their corporate limits, provided the regulation is not unreasonable.” 
(quoting City of Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 73 N.E. 1035, 1040 (1905))). 
 262. See 7 MCQUILLIN, supra note 250, § 24:379 (collecting cases granting 
authority to local governments to regulate outdoor advertising). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Village of Larchmont v. Sutton, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929, 934 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1961) (citations omitted). It is perhaps worth mentioning that Thomas 
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Given the strength of authority granting local governments the 
power to regulate both consumer finance and outdoor signage, it is 
unlikely that courts will find either express or field preemption of 
the model small-loan ordinance included in Appendix A. The very 
existence of over 130 zoning ordinances specifically targeting high-
cost, small-loan lenders illustrates that state governments have not 
occupied the field of regulation over these lenders in every respect. 
Local governments continue to have broad zoning authority over 
consumer lenders because, like signage, this method of regulation is 
a matter of traditional local authority. Existing state regulations 
generally concern only the substantive terms and paperwork 
associated with loans.266 A few states require the display of loan 
prices or the contact information of state regulators inside lenders’ 
businesses.267 Virtually no states have adopted consumer financial 
regulation on the exterior signage of lender locations. Moreover, a 
cautionary exterior signage ordinance would not contradict the 
express provisions of state consumer-protection statutes.268 
Legislatures that have adopted even the most anemic state payday 
and car-title lending laws generally have included laudatory 
language in their legislation on the importance of consumer 
protection.269 A strongly worded local cautionary signage ordinance 
is consistent with the spirit of that public policy. Given the wide 
latitude traditionally given to local governments to regulate outdoor 
signs, courts should not hold that a local cautionary signage 
ordinance is preempted by the law of most states.  
                                                                                                     
Matthews’s influential treatise on model municipal ordinances includes an 
extensive list of regulations of all types of signs. See generally 4 THOMAS A. 
MATTHEWS, BYRON S. MATTHEWS & JUDITH O’GALLAGHER, MUNICIPAL 
ORDINANCES: TEXT AND FORMS ch. 51 (3d ed. 2010). 
 266. For an example of the substantive stipulations, see generally MO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 367.021–367.533 (2011). 
 267. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-23-401(1) (West 2011) (requiring lenders 
to post “a number the person can call to make a complaint to the [Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions] regarding the deferred deposit loan”). 
 268. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 367.185(5) (2011) (“[Lenders] shall post in a 
conspicuous location in each licensed office the maximum rates and fees that 
such person is currently charging on any loans made.”). 
 269. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 560.109(1), 560.408 (2011) (stating the intent to 
protect the public interest and prevent abuse of consumers). 
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C. A Predatory Lender Warning Signage Ordinance Is 
Constitutional 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”270 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes the First Amendment’s freedom of speech 
restrictions on state and local governments.271 The constitutional 
freedom of speech is a reflection of the American people’s “profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”272 Nevertheless, not 
all forms of speech are treated the same under the Constitution. 
There are two potential lines of cases that courts might use to 
analyze the constitutionality of the proposed cautionary signage 
ordinance: first, the government speech doctrine, and second, the 
compelled commercial speech doctrine.273 With respect to the 
former, “[t]he government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and 
correspondingly imprecise.”274 Courts are still gradually sorting out 
the criteria that will define when a communication constitutes the 
government’s own speech communicated with the assistance of 
private parties and when it constitutes private speech that the 
government compels.275 Moreover, there does not appear to be a 
consensus on the Supreme Court as to what distinguishes these 
forms of constitutional analysis.276 Both types of government action 
                                                                                                     
 270. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 271. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that “freedom 
of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and 
‘liberties’ protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the [s]tates”). 
 272. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 273. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637–38, 651 (1985) (discussing government speech and 
compelled commercial speech). 
 274. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 275. See Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
365, 366 (2009) (“[T]he Court has yet to announce a standard by which judges 
can reliably identify government speech across a range of cases.”). 
 276. For example, compare Johanns, 554 U.S. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“[A] compelled subsidy should not be justifiable by speech unless the 
government must put that speech forward as its own.”), with id. at 564 n.7 
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are potentially constitutional, but the analysis and scrutiny applied 
by the Supreme Court differs. This subpart argues that the 
proposed cautionary signage ordinance is best viewed as 
constitutionally permissible government speech. But, even if courts 
determine that the warning signs are private speech, the ordinance 
is nonetheless a constitutional form of compelled commercial speech. 
1. The Government Speech Doctrine 
The proposed cautionary signage ordinance engages in 
constitutionally permissible government speech. In recent years, the 
United States Supreme Court has explained that “the Government’s 
own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”277 The 
First Amendment precludes the government from impermissibly 
restricting freedom of speech, but it does not preclude the 
government from speaking. Thus, “[a] government entity has the 
right to ‘speak for itself.’”278 Indeed, government is “entitled to say 
what it wishes” and “to select the views that it wants to express.”279  
There are several examples of courts approving local 
government textual displays under the government speech doctrine. 
Most prominently, in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,280 the 
Supreme Court held that a monument reciting the Ten 
Commandments was a form of government speech not subject to 
First Amendment scrutiny.281 A small religious group, called 
Summum, challenged Pleasant Grove City when the city refused to 
                                                                                                     
(majority opinion) (“[T]he correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience 
realizes the Government is speaking . . . . [R]espondents enjoy no right not to 
fund government speech—whether by broad-based taxes or targeted 
assessments, and whether or not the reasonable viewer would identify the 
speech as the government’s.”); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 
U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“To date, our decisions relying on 
the recently minted government speech doctrine to uphold government action 
have been few, and in my view, of doubtful merit.”). 
 277. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 
553). 
 278. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217, 229 (2000)). 
 279. Id. at 467–68 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 280. Id. at 460. 
 281. Id. at 480. 
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allow the creed to donate its own religious monument for display 
alongside the city’s Ten Commandments monument.282 While the 
case also raised questions under the Establishment Clause, the 
Court granted certiorari specifically to analyze the right of 
governments to speak.283 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, 
emphasized that “[g]overnments have long used monuments to 
speak to the public.”284 The Court explained that, although city 
parks create a public forum for some purposes, no First Amendment 
values were offended by the government’s selective display of a 
religious monument.285 
Although Pleasant Grove City dealt with a local government’s 
permanent monument, lower courts have applied the same doctrine 
to more temporary local government textual displays. For example, 
in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District,286 the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed a public school teacher’s constitutional challenge to school 
officials’ refusal to allow him to post materials on a bulletin board 
reflecting differing viewpoints on the school’s gay and lesbian 
awareness month.287 A Los Angeles public school maintained a 
school bulletin board on which faculty and staff could post 
materials.288 Typical messages included content emphasizing 
acceptance of diversity and opposition to bullying.289 The school 
principal refused to allow the teacher to maintain a separate 
bulletin board with material challenging the morality of homosexual 
and lesbian behavior.290 The Ninth Circuit held that the school’s 
sign was government speech and therefore immune from First 
                                                                                                     
 282. Id. at 464–66. 
 283. Id. at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 284. Id. at 470 (majority opinion). 
 285. Id. at 480–81. 
 286. Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 287. Id. at 1005. 
 288. Id. at 1005–06. 
 289. Id. at 1006.  
 290. Id. at 1006–07. 
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Amendment scrutiny.291 “Viewpoint neutrality” analysis did not 
apply “because it [was] a case of the government itself speaking.”292  
Similarly, a third case dealt with the tobacco industry’s 
challenge to a state government’s imposition of a surtax on cigarette 
sales to fund an anti-tobacco advertising campaign that included 
billboard messages along with radio, television, and print 
advertising.293 Among other messages, the advertising campaign 
included television advertisements displaying the text “WARNING: 
The tobacco industry is not your friend” and “WARNING: Some 
people will say anything to sell cigarettes.”294 Rejecting the 
application of the compelled speech doctrine, the court instead 
applied the government speech doctrine in finding the speech 
constitutional.295 
A more difficult question arises in determining what 
communications are government speech when there is some 
combination of private and public action. However, the government 
“is not precluded from relying on the government speech doctrine 
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental 
sources.”296 The Supreme Court has held that “[a] government 
entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views when it 
receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of 
delivering a government-controlled message.”297 Similarly, the 
government may speak without First Amendment scrutiny where it 
“regulate[s] the content of what is or is not expressed . . . when it 
enlists private entities to convey its own message.”298 For example, 
in Pleasant Grove City, the Supreme Court considered the Ten 
Commandments monument at issue to be government speech even 
                                                                                                     
 291. Id. at 1013 (“We conclude that when a public high school is the speaker, 
its control of its own speech is not subject to the constraints of constitutional 
safeguards and forum analysis . . . .”). 
 292. Id. at 1011. 
 293. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 294. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 295. Id. at 920. 
 296. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005). 
 297. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009). 
 298. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 
(1995). 
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though private citizens fabricated and donated the sign itself.299 
Similarly, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the Supreme 
Court reviewed a congressional program forcing farmers to 
subsidize a government advertising campaign promoting beef.300 
Despite the compelled private support for the program and the use 
of private entities in producing the advertising campaign, the Court 
nonetheless upheld the program as government speech.301 
The key criteria announced by the Court in distinguishing 
government from private speech are whether the government 
“‘effectively controlled’ the messages sent” and whether the 
government is “exercising ‘final approval authority’ over [its] 
selection.”302 A federal district judge has emphasized that “[t]he 
determination as to whether speech is properly characterized as 
government speech or private speech turns entirely on ‘who is 
responsible for the speech.’”303 Several Supreme Court Justices have 
also emphasized that government speech is immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny only where it is clear that the government is 
speaking, as opposed to a private party.304 The government is not 
allowed to avoid electoral accountability for its speech by concealing 
its message within the voice of private entities.305 
In the proposed cautionary signage ordinance, a local 
government adopting the ordinance would “effectively control” the 
message conveyed in the municipal signs because the language of 
the signs is crafted within the city or county’s legislative process. 
                                                                                                     
 299. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 464–65. 
 300. Johanns, 554 U.S. at 553–55. 
 301. Id.  
 302. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 473 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 
560–61). 
 303. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d. 1085, 1100 (E.D. 
Cal. 2003). 
 304. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The 
government may not, consistent with the First Amendment, associate 
individuals or organizations involuntarily with speech by attributing an 
unwanted message to them, whether or not those individuals fund the speech, 
and whether or not the message is under the government’s control.”); id. at 569 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (“I resist ranking the promotional 
messages funded under . . . [an Act of Congress], but not attributed to the 
Government, as Government speech . . . .”). 
 305. Id. at 577–79 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
“WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER” 957 
Indeed, there is even greater government control under the 
proposed ordinance than in either Pleasant Grove City or Johanns. 
In the former, the sign itself was created and donated by private 
citizens.306 In the latter, the Court held that the beef advertising 
campaign was government speech even though the advertisements 
were produced and directed by private contractors, subject to 
approval by the government.307 In the case of the proposed 
ordinance, the government not only effectively controls the message; 
indeed, it completely controls it by permitting no language other 
than the words the city or county government itself has spoken.  
Moreover, there is no question that the cities and counties 
adopting the proposed ordinance would exercise final approval 
authority over the cautionary signs by voting in the legislative 
process to speak the very message adopted by the ordinance. Just as 
Pleasant Grove City had final approval authority on whether to 
display the donated Ten Commandments monument,308 so too 
would local governments have final approval on the precise wording 
and format of predatory lender warning signs. In both the Pleasant 
Grove City display and the proposed ordinance, a local government 
is displaying language that it approves of and is accountable for.  
While it is true that predatory lenders are likely to object to the 
message of the cautionary signage ordinance, there is no 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the government speech 
doctrine as applied to the proposed ordinance. High-cost lenders 
have no right to force the government to only say things that 
lenders agree with. As Justice Scalia has observed, “It is the very 
business of government to favor and disfavor points of view.”309 
There is no credible argument that, by speaking to citizens in their 
own voices, local governments will close off a public forum of debate, 
since predatory lenders are free (and entirely likely) to respond 
vigorously with their own views. Similar to the school bulletin board 
in Downs, in the case of the proposed cautionary signage 
                                                                                                     
 306. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2009). 
 307. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 566–67. 
 308. Please Grove City, 555 U.S. at 473. 
 309. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
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ordinance,“[w]e do not face an example of the government opening 
up a forum for either unlimited or limited public discussion.”310  
Furthermore, the proposed signage ordinance poses no risk that 
the source of the government speech will be misattributed to a non-
governmental speaker. The signage ordinance’s warning is “clearly 
identified as coming from the government itself.”311 To further 
emphasize the government as the source of the speech, the 
ordinance calls on the government to use its official municipal seal 
to visually reinforce that the language is the government speaking 
rather than the lender or some other private entity. There is no risk 
that the public will be unable to decipher the source of the 
cautionary message and thereby be frustrated in electoral efforts to 
hold the government accountable for its speech.  
Predatory lenders will perhaps argue that the fact that 
warnings are displayed on private property precludes application of 
the government speech doctrine.312 However, nothing in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on government speech points to the 
physical location of the speech as dispositive. Rather, the Court has 
focused on the government’s control of the message and final 
approval of content as the defining characteristics of government 
speech. Indeed, in Johanns, the Court found that the beef 
                                                                                                     
 310. Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 311. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 920 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 312. For those local governments unwilling to risk a First Amendment 
challenge, another policy option would be simply installing government created, 
owned, and maintained warning signs as close as possible to predatory lending 
locations. Most American cities and counties retain ownership of a small strip of 
land separating public roads from merchants’ private property. Such a strategy 
would be the surest ordinance to survive constitutional challenge because it 
would avoid the use of any private action or property. Moreover, the cost of 
designing, installing, and maintaining warning signs could be raised from 
revenue generated through predatory lending permit fees. The mere fact that 
predatory lenders would have to pay for government warning signs would not 
detract from the constitutionality of the ordinance because “compelled funding 
of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.” Johanns 
v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 554 U.S. 550, 559 (2005). Moreover, this analysis is 
altogether unaffected by whether the funds for the warning signs are “raised by 
general taxes or through a targeted assessment.” Id. at 562. “Citizens may 
challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no First Amendment 
right not to fund government speech. And that is no less true when the funding 
is achieved through targeted assessments devoted exclusively to the program to 
which the assessed citizens object.” Id.  
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advertising campaign was government speech even though the 
advertisements were produced by marketing firms on private 
property, broadcast from private television and radio stations, and 
viewed in private homes and private businesses. The proposed 
ordinance’s use of existing signage is best viewed from a 
constitutional perspective as government speech that “merely . . . 
solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources.”313 If adopted, 
courts should view the proposed ordinance “as an avenue for the 
representation of citizens’ higher-minded desires even when as 
consumers they act with perhaps lower-minded motives.”314 
2. The Compelled Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Even if the courts somehow decide that the proposed local 
government signs are private speech, the ordinance is nevertheless 
likely an example of constitutionally permissible compelled 
commercial speech. The core purpose of freedom of speech is to 
“assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.”315 In furtherance 
of this purpose, the Supreme Court has most closely scrutinized 
what Robert Post has called “public discourse,” the nature of which 
is “to ensure that a democratic state remains responsive to the 
views of its citizens.”316 While commercial speech also receives 
constitutional protection, the Court less closely scrutinizes this form 
of expression.317 
Although the Court has had difficulty articulating the boundary 
between public discourse and commercial speech, in the seminal 
case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission, the Supreme Court defined commercial speech as an 
                                                                                                     
 313. Id. 
 314. Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1667, 1683–84 (2001). 
 315. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 316. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA 
L. Rev. 1, 4 (2000). 
 317. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 562–63 (1980) (“The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”). 
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“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”318 At other times, the Court has pointed to 
“speech that proposes a commercial transaction” as the hallmark of 
commercial expression.319 Additionally, other cases have pointed to 
speech constituting an advertisement, speech that refers to a 
product or service, and economically motivated speech as indicative 
characteristics of commercial expression.320 Despite these attempts 
at defining commercial speech, this category of First Amendment 
analysis has been controversial and, in the view of some, 
inconsistent.321 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has tolerated more aggressive 
government regulation of commercial speech for at least two 
reasons:  
First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the 
market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to 
evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the 
underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the offspring 
of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not 
particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad 
regulation.322  
Furthermore, government action that merely compels speech, such 
as warnings or disclosures, receives less constitutional scrutiny than 
                                                                                                     
 318. Id. at 561. 
 319. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) 
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989)). 
 320. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983); see also 
Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine: The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 
168 (2009). 
 321. See Post, supra note 316, at 2 (explaining that commercial speech 
doctrine is “a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment 
jurisprudence”). Former Chief Justice Rehnquist notably argued that 
commercial speech ought to receive no constitutional protection at all. Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 598–99 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Many scholars have agreed. See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 812–18 (1999); C. Edwin Baker, 
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 
(1976); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry 
into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 352–55 (1978). 
 322. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6. 
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restrictions of speech.323 The Supreme Court has explained that less 
constitutional scrutiny is appropriate “[w]hen a State regulates 
commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading, 
deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of 
beneficial consumer information, [because] the purpose of its 
regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional 
protection to commercial speech.”324 The Supreme Court has not 
viewed the withholding of commercial information—that is, the 
right not to speak—as a fundamental right when a commercial 
speaker is marketing her services.325 As the Second Circuit has 
stated, in contrast to restrictions of speech, “disclosure furthers, 
rather than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of 
truth and contributes to the efficiency of the ‘marketplace of 
ideas.’”326 Accordingly, “less exacting scrutiny is required than 
where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted.”327 
In sum, the First Amendment is satisfied “as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing deception of consumers.”328 The majority in Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel329 explained that “in virtually all our 
commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized that 
                                                                                                     
 323. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) 
(stating that warnings and disclosures receive “less than strict review”). 
 324. Id.; see also Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d 
Cir. 2001); see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006) (reporting of federal election campaign 
contributions); 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2006) (securities disclosures); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 
(2006) (tobacco labeling); 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (2006) (nutritional labeling); 33 
U.S.C. §1318  (2006) (reporting of pollutant concentrations in discharges to 
water); 42 U.S.C. §11023 (reporting of releases of toxic substances); 21 C.F.R. 
§ 202.1 (2011) (disclosures in prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R. 
§1910.1200 (2011) (posting notification of workplace hazards). 
 325. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 
(1985) (“The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information 
regarding his services is not . . . a fundamental right.”). 
 326. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 114. 
 327. Id.; see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 769 
n.9 (1988) (stating that “[p]urely commercial speech is more susceptible to 
compelled disclosure requirements” than is personal or political speech). 
 328. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. 
United States, 130 S.Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) (stating that when the government 
“impose[s] a disclosure requirement rather than an affirmative limitation on 
speech . . . the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer . . . governs”). 
 329. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626. 
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because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an 
advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, warnings 
or disclaimers might be appropriately required in order to dissipate 
the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”330 In applying 
these constitutional principles, courts have upheld “[i]nnumerable 
federal and state regulatory programs [that] require the disclosure 
of product and other commercial information.”331 
The proposed predatory-lender-warning ordinance is properly 
viewed by courts as a constitutionally permissible warning 
requirement. Unlike, for example, signs and billboards used in 
political election campaigns, the signs outside payday and car-title 
lending locations are displayed entirely for commercial purposes. 
They are designed to solicit and encourage customers to borrow 
money. Moreover, the cautionary signage ordinance is itself 
designed to provide warning information to citizens who 
contemplate engaging in these entirely private transactions. The 
ordinance’s warning requirement does not affect how people interact 
with the state, nor does it affect the communication associated with 
lenders’ personal affairs. The ordinance also does not interfere with 
the relationship between borrowers and predatory lenders. Lenders 
remain free to, for example, charge ruinous interest rates to poor 
families. Moreover, the ordinance does not attempt to prohibit or 
restrict any speech by predatory lenders.332 Unlike many laws, such 
as advertising bans, the ordinance does not limit any speech by 
anyone. Rather, it merely adds a cautionary note authored by the 
government as advice to borrowers of the significant risks of high 
interest rate loans. Notwithstanding the warning requirement, 
predatory lenders would remain free to continue advertising their 
                                                                                                     
 330. Id. at 651 (citations, ellipses, and original alterations omitted). 
 331. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001); see 
also Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (upholding the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act’s requirement that cigarette packages contain warnings). 
 332. Cf. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (stating that government 
“may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading 
information . . . if the information also may be presented in a way that is not 
deceptive”); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Tera Jckowski Peterson, Medium-
Specific Regulation of Attorney Advertising: A Critique, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 259, 290–91 (2007) (pointing to disclosure requirements as a less-
restrictive means of speech regulation on attorney advertising). 
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services in any non-deceptive way they choose. Nothing in the 
proposed ordinance requires lenders to repeat an objectionable 
message out of their own mouths.333 Indeed, predatory lenders could 
counteract the local government’s warning within their store 
signage itself. Given the triple-digit interest rate profit incentives of 
predatory lenders, we should expect this type of counteractive 
speech to be just the sort of “hardy breed of expression” that courts 
need not be overly concerned with stifling.334 The consumer-
protection-oriented nature of the ordinance is squarely within the 
policy goals at the heart of the subordinate constitutional protection 
of commercial speech. 
The proposed ordinance is reasonably designed to counteract 
the confusing and deceptive speech of predatory lenders. As 
Professor Post has observed, the Supreme Court has deployed 
weaker constitutional protection in “social settings that . . . involve 
persons who are deemed dependent, vulnerable, or not fully 
rational.”335 Part III of this Article sets out empirical evidence of 
common behavioral patterns that inhibit the ability of borrowers to 
make rational and fully informed decisions in this market. It is 
reasonable for local governments to conclude that a provocative and 
prominent warning is needed to counteract the ability of predatory 
lenders to systematically manipulate borrowers’ less than fully 
rational behavior. Local governments are on a firm empirical 
foundation in believing that borrowers are unrealistically optimistic 
about their ability to repay high-cost debts that are aggressively 
marketed by predatory lenders.336 At the most basic level, the very 
names of many leading lenders in this market are, arguably, 
misleading. Many lenders have names emphasizing speed, 
convenience, and ease of access. Examples of small loan chains with 
this type of brand identity include: ACE Cash Express, Cash Loans 
Now, Cash N Run, Check ‘n’ Go, EZCash, FastBuck$, 
                                                                                                     
 333. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (finding 
that the government may not compel children, contrary to their conscience, to 
salute the American flag). 
 334. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 549 n.16 (5th Cir. 
2001) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980)). 
 335. Post, supra note 316, at 4. 
 336. See supra notes 67–90 and accompanying text. 
964 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012) 
FastCash4You, Money Now, Quick Cash Financial Services, and 
SpeedyCash. It is not a coincidence that all of these brands 
emphasize “cash now” instead of “crushing interest payments later.” 
Local government leaders would be reasonable in finding that many 
borrowers would benefit from a strong cautionary message because 
of borrowers’ tendency to unwisely discount the value of future 
wealth and to exhibit distress-induced, abbreviated reasoning 
patterns. 
Moreover, local governments could reasonably conclude that 
many borrowers have great difficulty in processing and comparing 
even basic financial and legal information necessary to compare 
value in consumer finance.337 While payday and car-title lenders 
argue their contracts are simple, their contracts often impose many 
contingent and confusing fees and practices including “default 
rates,” “service charges,” “insufficient funds fees,” “returned check 
fees,” “collection costs,” “late fees,” “renewal fees,” “court costs,” 
“process service fees,” “filling fees,” and “attorneys’ fees.”338 For the 
millions of Americans who lack even basic qualitative and 
quantitative literacy, these contracts are complicated and difficult to 
compare. Because default is common in the industry, these difficult-
to-compare contingent fees are likely to have a greater effect on true 
costs in comparison to more mainstream financial products. 
Many borrowers have virtually no incentive to comparison-shop 
because they realize that they will not be able to spot the various 
tricks and traps predatory lenders lay in the inscrutable boilerplate 
legal provisions that accompany even relatively simple loans. A 
person of minimal quantitative and legal literacy may rationally 
recognize that the transactional costs of identifying which lenders 
have hidden tricks and traps within their adhesive boilerplate dwarf 
the potential utility from what may be a futile exercise in shopping. 
In a heterogeneously segmented market, there is no guarantee that 
any lender will offer a credit-impaired borrower better terms, 
preferring to compete through aggressive collection practices 
instead of low, transparent pricing. Moreover, borrowers’ perception 
of the incentive to incur shopping costs may be informed by the fact 
                                                                                                     
 337. See supra notes 91–114 and accompanying text. 
 338. All fees are taken from sample payday loan contracts on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review.  
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that in many consumer contexts, the law allows businesses to 
unilaterally change the terms of a consumer’s deal after the fact 
anyway.339 Even rational borrowers should discount the prospective 
benefit of shopping based on the realization that they have a very 
minimal chance of gaining access to counsel or a fair day in court to 
enforce those provisions of the agreement that might actually favor 
them.340 
                                                                                                     
 339. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (2010) (describing when a 
creditor is required to give notice of changes that the creditor makes to a home-
equity plan); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that a consumer is bound by terms received after payment if the 
consumer does not return the product); Alces & Greenfield, supra note 12, at 
1145 (“Use of contract provisions that authorize the dominant party to change 
the terms of the contract at will are omnipresent in a wide range of contracts for 
credit and services.”); William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over 
Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1099, 1109 (2004) (“[T]he deal [in Hill] had 
been closed in commercial understanding and the vendor subsequently sought 
to establish further terms to an existing contract.”). 
 340. Compare DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004) (“[A]bout 
four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the 
needs of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”), CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, 
COURTS AND THE POOR 11 (1991) (discussing wealth discrimination in the court 
system), Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society 
Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 683 (2010) (describing “equal 
justice for all” as “an aspiration, not reality”), Russell Engler, Connecting Self-
Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel 
is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 92 (2010) (arguing for an expanded 
right to civil counsel), Russell Engler, Pursuing Access to Justice and Civil Right 
to Counsel in a Time of Economic Crisis, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 472, 498 
(2010) (“Tabling the concept of an expanded right to counsel turns as essential 
component of a fair judicial system into a luxury item.”), Jona Goldschmidt, The 
Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 37 (2002) 
(“[P]ro se litigants . . . often encounter bench and bar resistence.”), Robert A. 
Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 3 (2008) (“All too often immigrants are deprived of 
adequate legal representation . . . .”), Gene R. Nichol Jr., Judicial Abdication 
and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 325, 327 
(2010) (characterizing “our strongest and most pervasive transgression against 
access and equality” as the poor’s “exclusion from the effective use of our civil 
justice system”), and LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN 
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 
27–28 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/ 
documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (describing the importance 
of providing the poor with civil legal assistance), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of 
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science 
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Predatory lenders’ best argument will be that the label 
“predatory” is so pejorative that it cannot be characterized as 
commercial speech and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 
Although a few lower courts have attempted to argue that the 
Zauderer standard of scrutiny can only be applied to 
“uncontroversial information,”341 the Supreme Court has primarily 
focused on whether warnings are accurate statements.342 Thus the 
Court insists: “The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge 
accurate information regarding his services is not such a 
fundamental right.”343 Local governments should argue that the 
word is an accurate description given the abusive commercial 
practices prevalent in this industry. The word “predatory” is 
commonly defined as “inclined . . . to injure or exploit others for 
personal gain or profit.”344 At least eleven different federal 
regulatory agencies have publicly used the term “predatory” to 
describe some form of abusive lending.345 The label is commonly 
used by scholars and the press in describing lending regulated by 
the ordinance.346 Indeed, the word “predatory” has only come into 
common usage in recent years as a substitute for the adjective 
“criminal,” which had been, and still is, used in many states to 
describe these loans for hundreds of years. That Congress and many 
states have used a 45% interest rate as a criterion in establishing a 
                                                                                                     
of law . . . . Left without the aid of counsel . . . . [h]e lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect 
one.” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))). 
 341. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No.11-1482, 2011 WL 5307391, 
at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2011) (describing “the Zauderer exception for purely 
factual and uncontroversial information”). 
 342. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(“[W]e hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as 
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing the deception of consumers.”). 
 343. Id. 
 344. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 977 (11th ed. 2011). 
 345. See Peterson, supra note 31, at 5 (collecting examples). 
 346. See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Paul Wiseman & John Waggoner, 7 Things 
that Helped Break the Economy . . . And How Congress Aims to Fix Them, USA 
TODAY, June 28, 2010, at 1B (“At the core of the spiral: No regulatory authority 
had sole responsibility for protecting consumers from predatory lending and 
other abuses.”). 
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loan’s criminality is evidence that the term “predatory” is factual.347 
While the term “predatory” may exist at the outer bounds of 
commercial speech, it is factually appropriate for commerce at the 
outer bounds of legally acceptable behavior.  
While criminality is not a standard courts use to judge the 
constitutionality of compelled speech, it would nevertheless be an 
odd constitution that allows government to incarcerate people to 
prevent predatory lending but forbids government from deploying 
strongly worded warnings. Where a business solicits consumers to 
engage in a transaction that has been widely treated as criminally 
abusive for nearly three hundred years, the Constitution ought not 
to require only uselessly insipid, wishy-washy, and milquetoast 
warnings. The Constitution does not prevent the government from 
using “plain English” to warn vulnerable citizens about financial 
predators.348 The judicial preference for decorum is not a 
constitutional requirement. Recognizing this point, former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained that if courts hold otherwise, “[l]oan 
sharks might well choose States with unregulated small loan 
industries, luring the unwary with immune commercial 
advertisements.”349 Surely if the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
can label high-cost, small-loan lenders “loan sharks,” local 
governments are on a firm rhetorical footing with the relatively 
restrained label of “predatory lender.” As the former Chief Justice 
                                                                                                     
 347. See infra Part V.A and accompanying text. 
 348. See Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 767 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(upholding a congressional statute requiring that attorneys describe themselves 
as “debt relief agencies”); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 
906, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding a cigarette surtax funded public 
advertising campaign that attacked “not ‘the desirability of a product but . . . the 
moral character of [the] industry, accusing it of hypocrisy, cynicism and 
duplicity”); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 
530 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (rejecting application of strict scrutiny to tobacco industry’s 
First Amendment challenge to FDA graphic cigarette warning labels). But see 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA, No. 11-1482, 2011 WL 5307391, at *6–
8 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2011) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down the FDA’s 
graphic cigarette warning labels). 
 349. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 835–36 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). Moreover, a search of Westlaw’s Supreme Court Decisions database 
indicates that the United States Supreme Court has used the term “predatory” 
in various criminal and civil contexts in at least 109 different published 
opinions.  
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seems to have recognized, it is factually accurate to characterize 
lions, tigers, bears, and loan sharks as predatory. 
VI. Conclusion 
This Article has explored local government ordinances and 
resolutions that attempt to inhibit predatory lending within their 
communities. A growing trend of local government action has 
emerged following the failure of federal and state leaders to provide 
effective consumer protection laws. This vacuum in leadership on 
small, high-cost loans has developed despite the great majority of 
Americans who support banning predatory loans. Federal and state 
preemption of local financial regulation have left local governments 
with limited authority to act on their constituents’ wishes. However, 
because local governments traditionally have had broad authority to 
regulate merchants’ exterior signage, this Article suggests using 
that power to protect families from predatory loans. In particular, 
this Article proposes a model ordinance requiring that lenders 
offering loans with APRs in excess of 45% display a cautionary 
message that reads “Warning: Predatory Lender,” on their street, 
storefront, and other on-premises exterior signs. While these 
signage requirements are in some respects unusual, this flows from 
the great disparity in the wishes of the public and the law as it has 
come to be controlled by the powerful business interests that exert 
pressure on key financial services committees in state legislatures 
and Congress. Providing a strongly worded message of caution on 
exterior signs to warn predatory loan borrowers would allow local 
governments to seize the initiative to help vulnerable families. 
Given the strong empirical, historical, and moral evidence 
suggesting that predatory small loans are destructive for borrowers, 
their families, and our communities, local government leaders 
should use their offices to protect the citizens who elected them. 
Appendix A. Model Predatory Small Loan Ordinance 
[Insert Jurisdiction] ORDINANCE No. ____ 
PREDATORY SMALL LOAN ORDINANCE 
WHEREAS, there exist business practices, commonly referred to 
as “predatory lending,” whereby businesses lend small sums of 
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money at usurious and unconscionable interest rates to low- and 
moderate-income persons; and 
WHEREAS, small predatory loans have an unreasonably adverse 
effect upon the elderly, young families, members of our armed 
services and their families, the economically disadvantaged, and 
other citizens of [insert jurisdiction]; and 
WHEREAS, many predatory loan borrowers lack bargaining 
power and financial experience and have difficulty evaluating the 
risks, prices, and consequences associated with high-cost debts; 
and predatory loans cater to impulse borrowing that funds illicit 
drug use, gambling, and other activities that are otherwise 
deleterious of public thrift; and  
WHEREAS, predatory lenders falsely advertise their loans as 
fast and convenient, when in fact many borrowers fall captive to 
protracted cycles of repeat borrowing; and 
WHEREAS, predatory lending causes families to default on 
mortgage, rent, and utility payments; delay needed medical care; 
and lose their bank accounts; and 
WHEREAS, predatory lending locations increase crime; and 
WHEREAS, usurious lending is immoral and contrary to the 
values of the residents of [insert jurisdiction]; and 
WHEREAS, many less expensive and less dangerous personal 
finance options are widely available to [insert jurisdiction] 
residents through banks, thrifts, credit unions, pawnbrokers, and 
merchants; and 
WHEREAS, the federal government has determined that annual 
interest rates above 45% are indicative of predatory loan 
sharking; and 
WHEREAS, predatory lending was illegal and a criminal act 
throughout most of American history, including all thirteen 
original states, and in the state of [insert state]; and 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the City Council 
of [insert jurisdiction] ordains as follows:  
PART I.  Chapter [insert appropriate chapter] of the [insert 
jurisdiction] Code is hereby enacted to read as follows: 
Table of Contents 
Section 100.  Title for Citation 
Section 200.  Legislative Findings 
Section 300.  Definitions 
Section 400.  Administrative Authority 
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Section 500.  Licensing 
Section 600.  Signage  
Section 700.  Enforcement 
Section 800.  Severability 
Section 100.  Title for Citation 
The ordinance codified in this chapter shall be known and may be 
referred to as the PREDATORY SMALL LOAN ORDINANCE. 
Section 200.  Legislative Findings 
The [insert jurisdiction] Council finds as follows: 
(a) There exist business practices, commonly referred to as 
“predatory lending,” whereby businesses lend small sums of 
money at usurious and unconscionable interest rates to low- and 
moderate-income persons and target members of our armed 
services and their families; and 
(b) Small predatory loans have an unreasonably adverse effect 
upon the elderly, young families, the economically 
disadvantaged, members of our armed services and their 
families, and other citizens of [insert jurisdiction]; and 
(c) Many predatory loan borrowers lack bargaining power and 
financial experience and have difficulty evaluating the risks, 
prices, and consequences associated with high cost debts; and 
predatory loans cater to impulse borrowing that funds illicit drug 
use, gambling, and other activities that are otherwise deleterious 
of public thrift; and  
(d) Predatory lenders falsely advertise their loans as fast and 
convenient, when in fact many borrowers fall captive to 
protracted cycles of repeat borrowing; and 
(e) Predatory lending causes families to default on mortgage, 
rent, and utility payments; delay needed medical care; and lose 
their bank accounts; and 
(f) Predatory lending locations increase crime; and 
(g) Usurious lending is immoral and contrary to the values of the 
residents of [insert jurisdiction]; and many less expensive and 
less dangerous personal finance options are widely available to 
[insert jurisdiction] residents through banks, thrifts, credit 
unions, pawnbrokers, and merchants; and 
(h) The federal government has determined that annual interest 
rates above 45% are indicative of predatory loan sharking; and 
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(i) Predatory lending was illegal and a criminal act throughout 
most of American history, including all thirteen original states, 
and in the state of [insert state]; and  
Official Comments: 
1. The characterization of loans with exorbitant interest rates as 
“predatory” in subsection (h) is intended to reflect the policy 
objectives of federal law. Under current federal criminal law, an 
annual actuarial interest rate in excess of 45% is considered 
prima facie evidence that the loan is extortionate. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 892(b)(2) (2011). While there are additional elements present in 
the criminal prosecution of extortionate lending, the prima facie 
evidentiary threshold of 45% reflects congressional judgment that 
prices above this interest rate are indicative of criminal, and by 
implication predatory, behavior. The term “predatory” reflects 
Congress’s judgment that loans in excess of 45% are inclined to 
injure or exploit borrowers for personal gain or profit. 
Because this threshold is used by Congress as a legal device 
suitable for determining when high-cost lenders should be 
incarcerated, it is also appropriate as a threshold in warning 
potential victims of the likelihood of this potentially criminal and 
predatory behavior. The characterization of loans with interest 
rates in excess of 45% as predatory is supportive of existing 
federal law by warning borrowers regarding interest rates that 
Congress considers prima facie evidence of extortionate loan 
sharking. Because loans with exorbitant interest rates can be 
characterized as extortionate for purposes of criminal law, they 
can also be characterized as predatory for purposes of consumer 
protection law. 
Section 300.  Definitions 
As used in this Chapter unless the context requires otherwise: 
(a) “Annual Percentage Rate” shall be defined in accordance with 
federal law.  
(b) “Director” means the Director of the [insert appropriate 
administrative department]. 
(c) “Predatory Lender” means any person or entity that lends, 
brokers, or in any way extends a predatory small loan. 
 (d) “Predatory Lending Facility” means any location where a 
predatory lender conducts business. 
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(e) “Predatory Small Loan” means an extension of credit made at 
an annual percentage rate in excess of 45%. 
(f) “Warning Sign” means a sign required by this ordinance that 
includes the language “[INSERT JURISDICTION] WARNING: 
PREDATORY LENDER.” 
Official Comments: 
1. Subparagraph (a) and (e), in combination with Section 600,  
indicate that this ordinance applies to all lenders who make 
extensions of credit in excess of an annual percentage rate of 
45%. Since this ordinance defers to federal law on the definition 
of an annual percentage rate, the scope of this ordinance is 
coextensive with federal law as it is currently articulated in the 
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. Insofar as a financial 
service does not carry an annual percentage rate under federal 
law, the signage requirements of this ordinance would not apply 
to that transaction.  However, if federal law characterizes a 
service as imposing an annual percentage rate, the service is 
within the scope of this ordinance at the point that the rate 
exceeds 45%. 
Section 400.  Administrative Authority 
(a) The Director is authorized and directed to enforce all 
provisions of this Chapter. The Director shall have the power to 
investigate any and all complaints regarding alleged violations of 
this Chapter. The Director may delegate any or all authority 
granted under this Section to any supervisor, employee, or agent. 
(b) The Director is authorized to adopt and enforce 
administrative rules interpreting and applying this Chapter. The 
Director or designee shall make written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to support all decisions. 
(c) Prior to adoption of a new administrative rule, the Director 
shall give notice to all interested parties of the terms of the 
proposed rule and shall conduct a public hearing to consider 
public comment. Public notices shall be given when 
administrative rules have been adopted. 
 (1) At the public hearing, the Director or designee shall hear 
oral and written testimony concerning the proposed rule. The 
Director shall have the power to establish and limit the matters 
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to be considered at the hearing, to prescribe procedures for the 
conduct of the hearings, to hear evidence, and to preserve order. 
 (2) The Director or designee shall adopt, modify, or reject the 
proposed ruling after considering testimony received during the 
public hearing. 
 (3) Unless otherwise stated, all rules shall be effective upon 
adoption by the Director.  
 (4) The Director shall take reasonable and customary steps 
to make all final rules available to the public. 
 (5) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2) of this Section, 
the Director may adopt an interim rule without prior public 
notice upon a finding that failure to act promptly may result in 
serious prejudice to the public interest or the interests of the 
affected parties. Such interim rules shall detail the specific 
reasons for such prejudice. Any interim rule adopted pursuant to 
this paragraph shall be effective for a period not to exceed 180 
days. 
Section 500.  Licensing 
(a) Within 90 days of the effective date of the ordinance enacted 
in this Chapter, any predatory lender operating in [insert 
jurisdiction] shall apply for and obtain a permit to operate as a 
predatory lender. Permits shall be required for each location a 
lender operates in [insert jurisdiction] and shall be renewed 
annually. The application shall be in a form to be determined by 
the Director or the Director’s designee. No person shall operate a 
predatory lending business located in [insert jurisdiction] without 
a current permit to do business issued by [insert jurisdiction]. 
(b) The annual permit fee for each location shall be $10,000 in the 
first year following enactment of this ordinance.  In each 
subsequent year following enactment of this ordinance, the 
Director shall adjust the annual permit fee to account for 
inflation or deflation based on the Consumer Price Index as 
calculated by the United States Department of Labor Bureau of 
Labor Statistics or based on another comparable measure of price 
change designated by the Director. 
(c) Predatory lending permits shall be required in addition to the 
[insert jurisdiction] business license required by section [insert 
appropriate code section] of the [insert jurisdiction] Code. 
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Official Comments: 
The predatory lending permit requirement of this Section is not 
intended to replace the normal business operating licenses 
customarily required by most cities and counties. Rather it is 
intended as an additional permit focused on businesses making 
high-cost consumer loans. The purpose of this permit 
requirement is to assist the Director in monitoring compliance 
with the Predatory Small Loan Ordinance as well as to generate 
revenue to cover the operating costs of local government. 
Section 600.  Signage 
(a) It is unlawful and a violation of this code for any predatory 
lender to operate a predatory lending facility, unless the premises 
where the predatory lending facility is operated displays exterior 
signs conforming to the requirements of this section. 
(b) All exterior signs displayed at the business location of a 
predatory lender shall be modified to include the [insert 
jurisdiction] disclosure statement:  “[INSERT JURISDICTION] 
WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER.” The [insert jurisdiction] 
disclosure statement shall substantially occupy 33% of the spatial 
area on all signs governed by this section. The 33% area allocated 
for the disclosure statement shall be composed of a black, Arial, 
all-capitals text on a white background.  
(c) Predatory lenders operating within [insert jurisdiction] shall 
obtain and display official [insert jurisdiction] predatory lending 
door signs on all exterior doors at any predatory lending facility.   
(d) The Director shall design and distribute to predatory lending 
facility permit holders official [insert jurisdiction] predatory 
lending door signs. The predatory lending door sign shall be 
designed to be visible by persons entering the predatory lending 
facility. The predatory lending door sign shall be designed to 
substantially occupy the entire spatial area of exterior doors at 
the predatory lending facility. The director shall, in his or her 
discretion, have the authority to provide different types of official 
predatory lending door signs to accommodate mounting such 
signs on different types of exterior doors, so long as these 
variations are otherwise in compliance with the requirements of 
this Section. 
(e) Official [insert jurisdiction] predatory lending door signs shall 
have black, Arial, all-capitals text with a white background. Such 
door signs shall display the disclosure statement: “[INSERT 
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JURISDICTION] WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER.” In addition, the 
official door sign shall include the following explanatory 
comment: “[Insert jurisdiction] has determined that this facility 
engages in predatory lending. [Insert jurisdiction] has required 
this lender to display consumer protection warnings. This 
predatory lending facility lends at interest rates above 45%. 
These loans can cause bounced checks, penalty fees, 
repossessions, lawsuits, and severe financial hardship.” 
(f) All signs required by this Section shall display the [insert 
jurisdiction] official seal. 
Official Comments: 
1.  The purpose of this Section is to warn consumers about the 
risks associated with small predatory loans.  Many predatory 
loan borrowers lack bargaining power and financial experience 
and have difficulty evaluating the risks, prices, and consequences 
associated with high-costs debt. Moreover, many predatory 
lenders inaccurately characterize their loans as fast and 
convenient even though these loans often lead borrowers into 
captive, protracted cycles of repeat borrowing. The warning signs 
in this Section will serve to alert consumers to use caution when 
dealing with predatory lenders. 
2.  The warning signs required by subsections (b) and (c) are 
designed to make it clear to potential borrowers that the 
language employed is a communication from [insert jurisdiction]. 
The only warning that is required by [insert jurisdiction] are the 
exterior door signs required by subsection (c). However, if a 
predatory lending facility chooses to display additional signage at 
its business location, subsection (b) requires that these additional 
signs include a warning statement echoing the warning provided 
by official exterior door signs. This requirement is narrowly 
tailored to match the degree to which a predatory lender 
advertises at its location. The amount of required warning 
signage matches the amount of predatory lending advertisement 
chosen by the predatory lender.  
3.  Predatory lending facilities may have various types of pre-
existing signage. Subsection (b) does not require a single 
authorized sign design, except as specified by the requirements of 
this Section. To assist predatory lenders in complying with 
subsection (b), this comment includes several illustrative 
examples:  
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a. Monument sign: 
 
 






“WARNING: PREDATORY LENDER” 977 
4.  Subsections (d) and (e) give the Director discretion to design 
the official [insert jurisdiction] exterior door sign. Official exterior 
door signs are required on all exterior doors in order to prevent 
predatory lenders from only placing the official exterior door sign 
on a door not regularly used by customers entering the predatory 
lending facility. The following illustration is an example of the 
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Section 700. Enforcement 
(a) The remedies provided herein are cumulative and 
supplementary and apply to licensees and unlicensed persons to 
whom this Ordinance applies, even when they failed to obtain a 
permit as required. 
(b) The Director shall have the authority to bring suit to enforce 
this Ordinance. A predatory lender found in violation of this 
Ordinance shall be liable for a statutory penalty of $10,000 per 
month per signage violation, together with any and all costs and 
attorney fees incurred by [insert jurisdiction] in enforcing this 
Ordinance.  
(c) Any borrower who obtains a loan from a predatory lender in 
violation of this ordinance shall have the right to enforce the 
provision of this Ordinance through an individual or class-
representative lawsuit. A predatory lender found to have violated 
this Ordinance shall be liable to each borrower for actual, 
consequential, and statutory damages of $2,000 for each signage 
violation, together with costs and reasonable attorney fees, as 
well as any appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief. The 
remedies provided in this Section are not intended to be the 
exclusive remedies available to borrowers nor to require 
borrowers to exhaust any administrative remedies provided by 
contract or any other applicable law. 
(d) Any predatory lending facility operated, conducted, or 
maintained in violation of this Ordinance or any other federal or 
state law shall be, and hereby is, declared to be unlawful and a 
public nuisance. The Director may, in addition to or in lieu of any 
other remedies set forth in this Ordinance, commence an action 
to enjoin, remove, or abate such nuisance in the manner provided 
by law and shall take such other steps and apply to such court or 
courts as may have jurisdiction to grant such relief.   
(e) In each subsequent year following enactment of this 
Ordinance, the Director shall adjust the statutory penalty and 
damage provisions of subsections (b) and (c) to account for 
inflation or deflation based on the Consumer Price Index as 
calculated by the United States Department of Labor Bureau of 
Labor Statistics or based on another comparable measure of price 
change designated by the Director.  
Section 800.  Severability 
If any portion of this Ordinance is determined to be invalid for 
any reason by a final, non-appealable order of any court of this 
state or of a federal court of competent jurisdiction, then it shall 
be severed from this Ordinance. All other provisions of this 
Ordinance shall remain in full force and effect. 
